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Abstract
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological health issues have emerged as a
signature pathology of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the full continuum of
care in the U.S. military for PTSD and related disorders is reported to be insufficient to meet the
current and future needs of service members and their beneficiaries. The influence of external factors
such as pre-traumatic risk factors and the availability of unit-level and enterprise-level resilience
resources on eventual mental health outcomes have been previously considered individually, but not
together in an enterprise-wide context. Although systems thinking has been applied to transform
general health care systems in the United States and recommended for the military health system,
there has been limited application of such ideas to the military health care system at large.
This thesis expands on previous systems thinking work to transform health care systems in
the United States by building a multi-level, dynamic model of the military psychological health
enterprise from accession and deployment to future psychological health screening and treatment.
The model demonstrates the relationships between stress, resilience and external unit-level and
enterprise-level resources, and the influence of pre-traumatic risk factors, effectiveness of pre-
deployment resilience resources and the availability of psychological health treatment in theater are
evaluated using sensitivity analyses in order to formulate recommendations for upstream initiatives
to improve downstream health outcomes.
Increasing participation in pre-deployment resilience training and increasing unit support would
have the largest effect on decreasing the number of service members predicted to develop symptoms
of PTSD. Thus, it is recommended that the military consider fitting potential at-risk service members
to resilience training, developing concurrent strategic short-term and long-term operational policy-
making processes, and linking accession data to health outcomes to inform future psychological
health policy creation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 1 presents the motivation for this research and also discusses the purpose and objectives
that this thesis aims to achieve. The theoretical research model that this research is based upon and
expands on is discussed in Section 1.3, and its limitations are explained in Section 1.4. Finally, the
contributions and overview of this research work are presented in Sections 1.5 and 1.6.
1.1 Research Motivation
Military service members face stressful situations during deployment. The academic literature and
media attention increasingly focuses on those service members returning from Operation Iraqi Free-
dom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan displaying symptoms of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological health illnesses. Twenty-six percent or
more of returning troops are likely to display symptoms of PTSD and the number of diagnoses has
increased in recent years [44]. As a result, efforts have been made to develop health care systems
for delivering quality care to the military community, with an emphasis on coordination across the
entire continuum of care (i.e. [51, 103]). It is only recently that these efforts have been expanded
to examine the system of care for psychological health care delivery in the military due to the large
number of service members returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan displaying symp-
toms for psychological health disorders such as PTSD and major depression [49, 33].
Compounding this complexity is the growing literature documenting the emergence of risk fac-
tors for PTSD, including prior experience to traumatic events and a history of mental illness [18].
Pre-traumatic risk factors have been found to increase the likelihood of developing PTSD symp-
toms [54, 80]. The added uncertainty regarding how prior stressful experiences and other risk
factors affect eventual health outcomes in the service member population requires the usage of a
systems approach in examining how these resources might be best leveraged for stress mitigation
among service members.
Because ensuring the mental health of the military service member population is important to na-
tional security [51], military leadership currently allocates financial and human resources intended
for creating resilience programs and resources to build force readiness to withstand stress experi-
enced during service. These funds are allocated by the Military Health System (MHS)'s Defense
Health Program (DHP) to create resilience programs such as Military OneSource and the Real War-
riors Campaign sponsored by the Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE). Line-item discretionary
funds assigned to the services are additionally utilized for service-specific resilience programs, ex-
amples being the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program and the Air Force's Airman
Resiliency Training (ART). However, the mechanism by which service-specific resilience programs
and other unit-level resources such as unit support mitigates individual-level risk factors and stress
across the system remains unclear. Furthermore, the impact of enterprise-level decisions made re-
garding combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been largely seen at the individual-level
(i.e. the number of overall service member PTSD diagnoses), but the effect at the unit-level has yet
to be determined.
1.2 Research Purpose, Key Questions and Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is three-fold:
1. Build a dynamic model of stress emergence. A system dynamics model of stress emergence
in the enterprise was created to understand the various decisions, interactions and policies that
resulted in the rise of PTSD as an enduring pathology of OIF/OEF. The model additionally
provides a high-level view on how individual and organizational decisions made at all system
levels to meet strategic operational goals persisted throughout the system, resulting in the
unanticipated emergence of military psychological health issues.
2. Investigate how unit-level resilience resources might impact the individual service mem-
ber from accession to treatment. Leadership has been shown to be the most influential
resource impacting an individual's resilience because it affects multiple areas of a service
member's life from education to training [13]. Furthermore, the unit provides additional sup-
port that may otherwise be absent from a service member's life. However, little is known
about the mechanisms by which these resources eventually affect individual-level dynam-
ics; for example, how risk factors for PTSD influence the overall number of service member
PTSD diagnoses over time.
3. Demonstrate how enterprise-level decision making impacts unit-level dynamics. A unique
aspect of the combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was the exponential growth of mil-
itary deployments since their inception [94]. The increased number of deployments are
thought to increase the stress experienced by service members [94], but how they affect the
entire military health system and unit-level resources in particular, remains unclear.
1.2.1 Key Questions
Four key questions were posed to frame how this thesis investigates these strategic decision-making
dynamics in the military mental health care enterprise:
" What are the key individual-, unit-, and enterprise-level dynamics that influenced the emer-
gence of PTSD as a signature pathology of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF)?
" Which enterprise-level interactions and relationships directly influence policymaking in the
military, and how do these relationships influence unit-level resources and service member
health outcomes?
" Which policy options are available to military leadership to affect service member health
outcomes while meeting strategic objectives are most salient in the enterprise?
" How large is the influence of unit-level resilience resources on individual-level dynamics, and
how does this effect compare to other policy options available to military leadership to affect
overall service member population health outcomes?
1.2.2 Objectives
The following research objectives were identified in order to answer these key questions:
* Model the flow of service members from accession to treatment. A stock and flow diagram
depicting how service members move from one phase of the military service lifecycle to
another provides the baseline case for analysis, and provides the foundation for assessing
how external factors would affect the service member population at large.
" Model the causal relationships between stress, resilience and external unit-level and
enterprise-level resources, and link them to the flow of service members. Although liter-
ature has identified causal relationships between stress and resilience, and external resources
and resilience [1 3], the dynamic mechanisms linking these causal relationships has not been
modeled. Furthermore, the effects of these causal relationships are manifested in the service
member flow from accession to treatment. Linking these causal relationships to the service
member flow provides a foundation for a holistic examination of the organizations, processes,
stakeholders and resources involved in all phases of the military service member lifecycle.
This ensures that any policy recommendations and their implications were considered across
the entire enterprise and not just from a particular stakeholder's point of view.
" Using sensitivity analyses, identify the key drivers of the military psychological health
enterprise that led to the rise of PTSD as a signature pathology of OIF/OEF. Key deci-
sions and policies influencing the emergence of PTSD as a signature wound of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan were identified in model sensitivity analyses to determine which policies
were the most and the least effective in driving expected outcomes.
" Determine potential policy implications for the strategic decision-making regarding men-
tal health care delivery for the individual service member. Potential policy implications
for strategic enterprise decision-making were examined and discussed to inform future work
in this area.
1.3 Theoretical Research Model: A Multi-Level Approach
The model expands on previous systems models created to model stress reactions by considering
individual-level risk factors for PTSD and how internal and external resources might additionally
predict performance outcomes. A previous system dynamics model of stress was created by Morris
(2010) as a method to quantitatively assess human factors and behaviors [64]. However, this model
defined resources as entities required to elicit a response action, differing from the definition of
external resources utilized for this thesis. Furthermore, the Morris (2010) model does not distinguish
between individual-level, unit-level and enterprise-level resources for stress.
The military has proposed a military demand-resource (MDR) model which accounts for key
interactions across demands and resources to predict service member resilience and performance
outcomes [13]. Although this model specifically defines external resources as military resilience
resources, both this model and the Morris (2010) model do not account for individual-level risk
factors that may predispose a service member to experiencing stress reactions.
A multi-level analysis of unit cohesion's relationship to stress and perceived combat readiness
was conducted across the individual-level and unit-level to elucidate the association between aggre-
gate unit stress and unit cohesion while accounting for individual-level differences [38]. While this
model did incorporate multiple dimensions and considered individual service member differences,
the model only accounted for unit cohesion and did not consider other unit resources. The Griffith
(2002) model also did not discuss causal relationships through which unit cohesion would influence
perception of combat readiness, or how unit dynamics would influence the individual service mem-
ber and vice versa. This analysis of unit cohesion to stress and combat readiness is one example of a
multi-level approach which examined the effect and relationship of unit cohesion while considering
individual-level differences.
The examination of complex organizations and systems using a multi-level approach is a rel-
atively recent evolution of organizational and management research, although the components of
a multi-level approach have been present throughout the literature [61, 63]. A literature review
conducted by Mathieu and Chen (2011) found that management research has evolved to consider a
multi-level approach combining three dimensions-theory, measurement and analysis, and that the
multi-level paradigm requires examination of driving variables not only from a focal unit of analysis
from also from levels above and below [61]. Further support for the multi-level approach was found
in Moliterno and Mahony (2011)'s work that expanded social network theory to include canonical
multi-level theory. Moliterno and Mahony (2011) showed that organizations should be studied as
nested networks, because they are multi-level systems which are made up of networks which exert
influence across organizational levels [63].
Figure 1-1 illustrates the preliminary model describing the proposed relationships between pre-
traumatic risk factors, individual-level dynamics, external unit-level resources and enterprise-wide
decision-making. This preliminary model is based on the work of Bacharach, et al. (2008), which
examined the relationship between the intensity of critical work place incidents experienced by
firefighters, resulting stress experienced and drinking to cope. It was found that there is a significant
association between the intensity of involvement in these critical incidents and drinking to cope, and
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Figure 1-1: Preliminary Operational Research Model - Adapted from [12]
that the adequacy of unit-level performance resources such as training and preparedness resources
attenuates the relationships between critical incidents and resulting stress, and stress and drinking
to cope [12].
Military service members experience incidents in combat operations which increase the likeli-
hood that a service member would experience the onset of PTSD symptoms as discussed previously
in this chapter [94]. Additionally discussed were the external resilience resources available for the
mitigation of these stress symptoms [13], intended to help ensure optimal service member perfor-
mance and health outcomes. However, the availability of these unit-level resources are governed
by both the service lines and enterprise-level leadership in the forms of government initiatives and
Department of Defense (DoD) directives, adding an additional level of complexity than that of the
Bacharach, et al. (2008) model. This work additionally builds upon the Bacharach, et al. (2008)
model in considering external individual risk factors and characteristics for stress and how they in-
fluence the level of stress experienced by an individual service member. This model also focuses
primarily on psychological health outcomes and job performance as opposed to coping mechanisms.
Finally, the Bacharach, et al. (2008) model only considers critical incidents in the workplace, as op-
posed to the cumulative effect of continuous stressors in the workplace environment. An example
of this would be the cumulative effect of deployments experienced by service members, which was
seen during OIF/OEF and considered to be a key factor in accelerating the onset of PTSD symptoms
experienced by returning service members [94].
1.4 Research Design and Limitations
This thesis employs a concurrent triangulation approach as described by Creswell in utilizing both
qualitative and quantitative data to determine if there is convergence, divergence, or some combina-
tion of the two [26]. It also uses the method of System Dynamics to effectively design and model
the military mental health enterprise in determining potential areas for improvement to inform fu-
ture work in the area. Further discussion of system dynamics as a research method can be found in
Section 3.2. A literature review and available quantitative data were used to populate and validate
some portions of the model, and the model was additionally validated with qualitative interview
data.
Limitations of this research include:
" This thesis research did not attempt to study all types of service members; rather, it focuses on
the experiences of active duty service members who fulfill all phases of the military service
lifecycle from accession to deployment to treatment. Other notable populations that could be
considered in future work might be National Guard and Reserve service members who may
not have engaged in typical basic training and resilience training.
e This thesis research did not attempt to study all psychological health processes throughout
the military service lifecycle. A focus was placed on accession and training processes as
this research was primarily concerned with the potential effect of pre-existing risk factors for
PTSD on a service member's behavior and experience throughout the service lifecycle.
" This thesis research was limited in terms of the number of interviews conducted, as well as the
types of organizations and services represented. Each military service and its relevant medical
institutions, as well as unit leaders have different requirements and methods for conducting
accession processes and resilience training. Furthermore, unit leaders may have unofficial
and undocumented methods for conducting resilience training and ensuring social support
throughout the military service lifecycle, which were not considered throughout this research.
Further research could consider these additional factors.
* This thesis research did not account for all possible scenarios that a service member might
encounter through the military service lifecycle. For example, the model currently indicates
that when a service member returns from deployment, he or she will either leave the service,
experience the onset of PTSD symptoms, or be deployed again. In reality, a service member
might remain in garrison indefinitely and not experience an onset of PTSD symptoms. Fur-
thermore, the model assumes that all service members experiencing PTSD symptoms will be
diagnosed and seek treatment, which does not occur in reality.
" This thesis research focused its quantitative analysis on service member populations in the
military service lifecycle, and did not quantify the unit-level and enterprise-level dynamics
explained in the model due to a lack of knowledge and data regarding those causal relation-
ships. For example, previous studies suggest that service member resilience is key to force
protection (i.e. [13]); however, there is little knowledge to date that indicates how current
resilience programs are performing with regards to increasing service member resilience and
decreasing service member stress. Furthermore, this thesis research was also limited with
regards to the quantification of more qualitatively defined variables such as Media Coverage
and Government Pressure.
1.5 Contributions of this Research
This thesis is part of a larger initiative by the Lean Advancement Initiative (LAI) at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in partnership with the MIT Collaborative Initiatives and
the Military Health System (MHS) to examine the full continuum of care for psychological and
mental health care, and presents areas for future research. More specifically, this thesis contributes
to the field of industrial engineering and management in building upon the model presented in [12]
by adding a third level of complexity, considering enterprise-level resources and applying the model
to the military psychological health sphere, and by including risk factors. Additionally, this thesis
research examines the effect of prolonged stress in the highly stressful work environment of military
service in contrast to Bacharach, et al. (2008)'s previous work on workplace critical incidents.
Next, this thesis contributes to the field of system dynamics by applying system dynamics to
model the military mental health care enterprise, providing military leadership with a comprehen-
sive view of interactions between individual, unit and enterprise-level behaviors and actions. Most
importantly, the system dynamics model provides a view as to how these actions may influence and
have negative side effects that may not otherwise have been seen and considered in policymaking
context.
Finally, this thesis provides potential policy recommendations that military leadership can con-
sider as they move forward in continuing initiatives to provide quality mental health care services
for its service members. This thesis additionally discusses implications of these policies that lead-
ership may consider in light of this work's limitations and the political and operational arenas in
which military leadership operates today.
1.6 Thesis Overview
This thesis continues with a discussion of the significance of PTSD as a significant pathology of war,
diagnostic criteria and documented risk factors for PTSD, and how these factors play into the chal-
lenges the U.S. military health care system faces in delivering quality mental health care services.
An examination of previous work done in using a systems engineering approach to challenges in
U.S. health care delivery will be also be discussed to illustrate the motivation for applying enterprise
systems thinking to the military mental health enterprise. Next, using the knowledge gleaned from a
system dynamics modeling of the military mental health enterprise, this thesis will investigate how
the enterprise could be architected in the future to enhance prevention and resilience in the military
mental health enterprise. Using an enterprise architecture framework developed at LAI, potential
policy implications and recommendations will be discussed, as well as how this work can contribute
to future research opportunities.
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Chapter 2
Using Systems Thinking to Improve
Military Psychological Health Care
Delivery
Because previous research has called for a systems approach for meaningful advancements in PTSD
(e.g., [19]), this thesis takes an enterprise systems approach to examine the full continuum of care
in response to post-traumatic stress and related conditions as provided by the targeted enterprise.
This chapter provides a backdrop for enterprise and systems engineering in health care delivery
in the United States, introduces an overview of the military mental health enterprise and discusses
why mental health care delivery in the military should be examined using an enterprise systems
approach.
2.1 Individual-Level Dynamics: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
PTSD is considered a significant pathology of OIF/OEF [94]. There is a five to 20 percent preva-
lence of PTSD among returning service members; over $2 billion has been invested across the
continuum of care for PTSD, with $650 million designated for over 125 new psychological health
programs [94]. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM),
published by the American Psychiatric Association and widely considered to be the standard crite-
ria for diagnosing mental disorders, PTSD is described by the following six diagnostic criteria:
o Stressor: exposure to a traumatic event, such as child or sexual abuse; terrorist attacks; combat
and military exposure
" Intrusive recollection: Persistent recollection of the traumatic event
" Avoidance/numbing: Persistent avoidance of the stimuli that triggered the traumatic event
* Hyper-arousal: Persistent arousal symptoms, not seen before the trauma, such as hyper-
vigilance, difficulty sleeping and outbursts of anger
" Duration: Symptoms last for at least one month
" Functional Significance: These symptoms cause disturbance in social, occupational or other
areas of normal life function [66]
2.1.1 Stress and Anxiety Disorders
Service members may also experience other transient conditions, including Acute Stress Reaction
(ASR) and Combat (or Ongoing Military) Operational Stress Reaction (COSR) that also relate to
physical or mental stress, but are typically transient in nature and thus are ideally managed differ-
ently than a more persistent condition [94]. This is important because the literature indicates that
acute and chronic PTSD takes approximately three months post-trauma to develop, but that signs of
ASR and COSR typically occur between two days to one month post-trauma, supporting the case
for early detection and treatment of symptoms [40]. Furthermore, the literature indicates that the
severity of traumatic events that can lead to the development of ASR are similar to those involved in
PTSD, suggesting that if ASR is left untreated, it can lead to acute and chronic PTSD (Figure 2-1).
In taking a systems view of the care for psychological health, services that could be provided by
the enterprise prior to or absent of a formal diagnosis are included. Therefore, this research takes
the broader stance of including programmatic and care services for post-traumatic stress reactions,
not only formally diagnosed and treated PTSD and related conditions.
2 ,1r 1 11 t M r h
Cobat Acute Stass AcutePTSD ChrnicSFsu - mnoTr PT[0
Figure 2-l1: Timeline of PTSD development [40]
Table 2.1: Documented Risk Factors for PTSD [54, 67, 80]
General Military-Specific
Previous exposure to trauma Combat exposures
Prior and/or family history of mental health issues Perceived threat
Poorly educated Post-trauma recovery variables
Little family or social support (internal resilience, unit/social support)
2.1.2 Influence of Documented Risk Factors for PTSD
Recent literature takes the approach of describing stress as a health-illness continuum to encourage
the early recognition of stress behaviors and early access to preclinical and clinical services when
needed [52, 106, 13]. The early recognition of stress behaviors introduces the question of the pres-
ence of factors that may signal an individual's predisposition to developing stress and other anxiety
disorders.
Various studies have demonstrated that there are pre-traumatic risk factors for PTSD, ranging
in salience and importance (Table 2.1). Literature indicates that the most generally salient pre-
traumatic risk factors include prior history or family history of mental health disease; poor educa-
tional achievement; a previous exposure to life-threatening events or trauma; and little family or
social support [67]. Additional risk factors experienced by military service members include war-
zone stressors such as combat exposure and perceived threat of harm, especially the threat of death,
serious injury and witnessing injury or death [54, 80].
In general, anyone who has experienced a life-threatening event, including combat or military
exposure, sexual assault, natural disasters or a terrorist attack is at risk for developing PTSD. Most
people who experience a traumatic event may never develop PTSD; the development of PTSD
depends on a number of factors, most important of which is the intensity and duration of exposure
to trauma [67].
The gradual development of PTSD from ASR and COSR demonstrates the need for considering
upstream initiatives in determining what factors to consider when formulating policy for PTSD
prevention and treatment; early detection and treatment of PTSD symptoms, whether they manifest
as ASR, could lead to an overall decrease in the number of service members who would otherwise
require PTSD treatment. However, the potential influence of documented pre-traumatic risk factors
for PTSD and other factors known at military accession has not yet been considered in this enterprise
systems approach, and may provide some insight as to how the military might use this information
to better serve their policymaking on an enterprise-wide level.
2.2 Unit-Level Dynamics: Resilience
The unit has been emphasized as a key external resource for building individual service member
resilience, as it provides external support via friendships and group identity for the individual service
member as the unit performs its mission [13]. Also considered a key resource is unit leadership,
pervasive throughout the unit and affecting all aspects of a unit's operational routine [13]. Because
a lack of social support has been discussed as a risk factor for PTSD, the presence of good unit
leadership and unit support might substitute for an individual's own lack of family or social support.
Although unit support is considered a key resource, negative attitudes and unit dynamics regard-
ing mental health care in the military have been recognized as factors dissuading service members
from seeking treatment [94]. The DoD has recognized that pervasive stigma within the service has
a substantial impact on the system of mental health care in the military, and as a result has initiated
efforts such as public service campaigns and enlisting providers to combat internal stigma in the
hopes that more service members requiring treatment will seek treament [94].
2.3 Enterprise Level Dynamics: The Military Health System (MHS)
The Military Health System (MHS) is the entity within the DoD which is responsible for providing
health care to U.S. military service members, service retirees and their dependents [92]. This section
will discuss the current challenges facing MHS and its obligations to service members. In addition,
this section will define and describe the boundaries of the MHS enterprise and the organizations and
processes under consideration for this thesis research.
2.3.1 Challenges for Psychological Health Care Delivery in the Military
Some of the challenges that affect the overall U.S. health care system influence certain health
care systems more intensely. Psychiatric disorders are a leading cause of Existing Prior To Service
(EPS) military discharges, most of which were concealed at accession, and expenses associated with
these losses cost the military approximately $27.3 million in 1998 alone, excluding the costs of med-
ical care, subsequent disability discharges and associated attrition [69]. Because these documented
risk factors for PTSD may present themselves at accession, it may be important for the military to
consider the salience of these risk factors in order to decrease the likelihood that service members
displaying risk factors for PTSD result in early discharges, leading to additional EPS expenses in-
curred by the military. Furthermore, mental illness in military service members is a leading cause
of healthcare utilization, and as military health care costs escalate and budgets remain constrained,
the current system may be rendered unsustainable [103].
As the entity in the DoD that is responsible for delivering health care services to military service
members and their families, perhaps one of the most important missions of MHS is to ensure a med-
ically ready force. MHS "identifies, develops and sustains critical military capability and readiness
in support of resource management and the operational planning process" [93]. Most applicable
to this thesis is MHS's responsibility to examine psychological stressors on the deployed force and
determine how best to prepare the service members for deployment into battle and between deploy-
ment cycles.
MHS defines Medical Readiness goals as the following:
" Managing warfighter fatigue: the ability to evaluate fatigue and monitor its effects on perfor-
mance;
" Enhancing warfighter sensory cognitive and motor capabilities: the ability to enhance and
sustain human performance within the sensory, cognitive and physical domains;
* Enhancing physiological capability: the ability to improve success within the physiological
domain, which includes neuroprotection, examining metabolic processes, enhancing the abil-
ity to withstand trauma, and the ability to maintain performance despite operational stressors;
" Providing/maintaining ability to operate across the full range of environments;
" Providing a healthy and fit force: the ability to provide and enhance a healthy and fit force
throughout the military service member's military career, from accession to veteran [93].
Although the focus of MHS regarding medical readiness falls largely on ensuring that service
members are medically ready to serve, another aspect of medical readiness also falls upon the readi-
ness of the medical professionals and medical operational units to perform medical duties during
military operations [48]. Military medical professionals and operational units tasked by MHS to
ensure that these medical readiness goals are achieved are expected to maintain a different kind of
medical readiness, which combines the attributes of medical training, clinical experience, military
training and military experience in order to ensure as much as possible that the medical readiness
goals of MHS can be met.
2.3.2 Overview of Enterprise Organization
An enterprise can be defined as a complex, integrated, and interdependent system of people, pro-
cesses, and technology that creates value as determined by its key stakeholders [72]. The targeted
enterprise (Figure 2-2) is comprised of several organizations that provide care and programmatic
services to all Active Duty and Reserve/Guard personnel and military retirees as well as their de-
pendents [102]. A listing of all relevant abbreviations and acronyms for organizations, titles and
terms used in this thesis can be found in Appendix A.
The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R) is a
policy-establishing entity that includes several other major policy-making organizations, including
Military Personnel Policy that advises Accession Policy, Military Entrance Processing Command,
and the Armed Forces Chaplain Board, Readiness that oversees military readiness and training
issues; and Military Community & Family Practice that oversees programs and policies that support
military families. The Office of the USD P&R also includes Health Affairs, which establishes the
Military Health System policies, procedures, and resources for deployment and garrison programs;
is informed by Force, Health Protection & Readiness (FHP&R) which informs policy decisions as
well as research and development; and oversees TRICARE-the health plan of the Military Health
System (MHS) that provides purchased care through contracted private providers [91].
Stakeholders in both the military and civilian sectors are working and adopting recommen-
dations to improve psychological health care delivery. The military's efforts are supported by
Congress, which has directed a task force within the DoD to examine all matters related to mental
health in the military and to provide Congress with recommendations to improve mental health care
delivery in the military [103]. While some psychological health care programs implemented within
the military have been found to be successful [30], the full continuum of psychological and mental
health care is also reported to be insufficient for meeting the current and future needs of service
members and their families [103]. This is, in part, due to disjointed efforts across the DoD, MHS,
and the U.S. Armed Forces to systematically identify issues and respond accordingly. For example,
experts have identified the need for the development and integrated use of a comprehensive set of
measures [88] and the evaluation of program effectiveness to drive process improvements [1 3, 105].
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Figure 2-2: Defined Boundaries of the Military Mental Health Enterprise
Also, recommendations for improved integration across MHS care systems in order to strengthen
accountability for fiscal management, align incentives, and strengthen the potential for continuous
improvement in the quality of care delivered to beneficiaries have been made [103]. A systems
perspective is advised for the realization of these types of improvements [19], but limited research
has considered such an approach. To date, there has been little research to identify areas in which
the military may leverage knowledge gained by the civilian health care system to implement further
recommendations for its own system-wide improvements efforts.
The U.S. Armed Services, i.e., the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines manage and deliver both
line related and medically related health care services in garrison and in theater. The enterprise
structure is such that the U.S. Armed Services Surgeons General are aligned through Health Affairs
and the medical commands of the Services provide direct care through the Military Treatment Facil-
ities (MTFs) and clinics by military personnel. The initial intent was for purchased care to be a gap
filler when direct care was unavailable or scarce due to location; however, purchased care currently
accounts for approximately 65 percent of the care that is provided and has approximately twice the
budget of direct care [103].
The Chiefs of Staff for the U.S. Armed Services are aligned through the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and provide line-related programs and services that support the psychological health
of service members. The dashed line connects and refers to the functional units of service members;
activities provided by military leadership that is occupational in nature are referred to as line-related
programs and services. While these functions do not directly relate to medical care, the role of line
leadership through formal mechanisms such as line-led operational stress training and resilience
training programs or through informal mechanisms such as leadership support is regarded as impor-
tant to the overall care of service members.
Community organizations offering PTSD and mental health services as well as organizations
and processes related to the VA lie on the enterprise boundary (the double-dashed line) as they do
not have formal connections with other organizations within the enterprise but should be considered
in order to get a holistic view of the entities that impact the system of care for post-traumatic stress
and related conditions.
2.3.3 Coordination of Enterprise Organizations, Processes and Programs
Figure 2-3 is a "waterdrop model" which shows the relationships between the key organizations in
the military mental health enterprise as defined in Section 2.3.2.
Ippolito and Srinivasan (2011) observed that there are two large clusters in which the current
state of the continuum of care for psychological health services operates; one revolves around the
MHS leadership/organization, and the second revolves around the execution of care surrounding the
service member [50]. Most importantly, although the execution of care delivery occurs on the in-
dividual service member level, the decision-making regarding policy implementation and resource
allocation occurs at the enterprise-level. This observation supports the extension of the Bacharach,
et al. (2008) model that this thesis proposes, as the theoretical research model discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3 extended the Bacharach, et al. (2008) model to include enterprise-level decision-making
through government initiatives and DoD directives. Ippolito and Srinivasan (201 1)'s observations
additionally support the initial research motivation for utilizing a systems approach to reveal po-
tential sources of inefficiencies, as the waterdrop model indicates differing degrees of interaction
between stakeholders in executing the delivery of care in the enterprise. However, the processes by
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which the execution of care occur have yet to be considered in this research work. The next section
will describe the lifecycle processes that are considered integral to the delivery of mental health care
services in the enterprise, and which are therefore most relevant to this thesis work.
2.4 Military Lifecycle Processes
Additional motivation to use a systems approach in examining military mental health care delivery
can be seen in the service member-centric view of the military deployment cycle (Figure 2-4). Al-
though each lifecycle process from Accession to Treatment may have its own separate organizations
and processes that are integral to each phase, there are high-level processes occurring throughout
the lifecycle which require the coordination and alignment of organizations and processes across
the military service lifecycle in order to operate at an optimal level. These processes include pre-
vention and resilience processes such as the Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program;
identification and treatment processes like the Post-Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) which
occurs when a service member returns from in-theatre combat; and rehabilitation and reintegration
processes for integrating service members back into civilian life.
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Figure 2-5: Health Assessment at the MEPS [79]
2.4.1 Accession
The military accession process typically begins after the service member decides to apply to the
military service. After submitting his or her application, the applicant travels to a Military Entrance
Processing Station (MEPS) for processing. The MEPS process all applicants to the U.S. Armed
Forces regardless of the service the applicant applied for, and their primary role in the military
lifecycle process, as specified by military regulations, is to determine whether the applicant is fit
to serve in the U.S. A ked Forces and which military jobs the applicant qualifies for [9]. An
explanation of each of the assessments performed at the MEPS follow below.
Health Assessment
Because military work often involves challenging physical tasks, a comprehensive health exam-
ination is done at the MEPS as part of the accession process (Figure 2-5). Prior to the physi-
cal assessment at the MEPS, the applicant completes a medical prescreen with a recruiter, Form
2807-2 [100]. Based on Form 2807-2, a recruiter can call a MEPS medical technician through the
Dial-A-Medic Program to ask questions about an applicant's medical eligibility if any concerns are
apparent. Medical prescreening forms and associated documentation are then forwarded to the local
MEPS for further processing.
The physical examination consists of the typical physical examination, an interview, and addi-
tional tests (urine, blood, drug and alcohol). The interview consists of questions regarding patient
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Figure 2-6: Health Assessment and Decision Making Regarding DoD Form 2807-2 Item 16
history, but most applicable to this thesis is Item 16 on Form 2807-2, related to psychiatric disorders.
The item is worded as follows: "seen a psychiatrist, psychologist, counselor or other professional
for any reason (inpatient or outpatient) including counseling or treatment for school, adjustment,
family, marriage or any other problem to include depression, or treatment for alcohol, drug or sub-
stance abuse [100]. Item 16 is intended to be a prescreen for identifying an applicant's history with
mental health, and asks the applicant if he or she has ever been treated for or diagnosed with a
mental health disorder, requiring a "Yes/No" response. If the applicant answers "yes" to Item 16,
there is follow-up interview done to investigate the reasons for why the applicant has been treated
for or diagnosed with a mental health disorder (Figure 2-6).
However, a full mental health assessment is not done during the accession process, although
there are questions asked during the health assessment that may signal to the physician conducting
the assessment that follow-up questions regarding mental health issues may need to be asked. For
example, Form 2807-1, Report of Medical History, Item 17 asks the attending physician to ask the
applicant if he or she has had a history of "nervous trouble of any sort (anxiety or panic attacks)",
"frequent trouble sleeping", "depression or excessive worry", or has "been evaluated or treated for
a mental condition", to name a few symptoms [99].
Medical Screening and the Granting of Health Waivers
Throughout the application and accession process, there are decision points in the system where
applicants are either disqualified or eligible for health waivers based on the information contained
in the medical prescreen (Figure 2-7). Each service has its own policies by which health waivers
are granted, and these waivers are granted by specific bodies in each service (Table 2.2)
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Table 2.2: Waiver-Granting Bodies in the Armed Forces
Service
Army
Navy
Air Force
Marine Corps
Who Grants Health Waivers
US Army Recruiting Command
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Air Education and Training Command
Surgeon General
Reviewed by Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
Recommendations Forwarded to
Naval Recruiting Command Chief
US Marine Corps Commandant
Data on each applicant are entered into the MEPCOM Integrated Resource System (MIRS),
which includes biographical information, medical profile, disqualification coding by parts of the
body, and waiver approvals.
Information Captured at Accession
General qualifications for serving in the Armed Forces are summarized as follows [7]:
" U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien
" 17-35 years old
" Healthy and in good physical condition
" In good moral standing
" High school or equivalent education
Figure 2-8 summarizes the number of applicants and accession rates for each service branch for
fiscal years 2004-2008 in comparison to 2009.
2004- 2008 2009
Service Applicants Accession rate Accession Applicants Accession rate
within fiscal year rate overall within fiscal year
Army 409,783 48.3 62.2 104,406 44.8
Navy 242,412 34.9 69.8 57,785 26.3
Marines 215,058 44.2 73.7 47,597 33.6
Air Force 164,675 42.4 80.9 41,582 40.3
Total 1,031,928 - - 251,370 -
Figure 2-8: Accessions for Enlisted Applicants at MEPS Who Received a Medical Examination by
Service: 2004-2008 vs. 2009 [2]
Education Credentials and Qualification Testing
Applicants are all required to take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), a
multiple-choice test that measures aptitude in ten different areas applicable to military work, such
as abilities in math and electronics [8). Also called the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT),
to be considered for enlistment, each service has a baseline score which can be an indicator for
acceptance into the service; for example, to enlist in the Army, an applicant should score at least a
31 on the ASVAB [8]. Figures 2-9 and 2-10 summarize the educational and AFQT score levels of
all applicants to each service branch in aggregate for fiscal years 2004-2008 in comparison to 2009.
2004-2008 2009
Education Applicants Accessions Applicants Accessions
Count % Count % Count % Count %
Below HS Seniort 20,559 2.0 11,336 1.6 5,124 2.0 2,018 2.1
HS Senior 289,302 28.0 201,334 28.2 55,522 22.1 17,489 18.5
HS Diploma 651,650 63.1 457,129 64.0 169,106 67.3 67,005 70.8
Some College 42,174 4.1 28,169 3.9 10,899 4.3 4,400 4.6
Bachelor's and 28,243 2.7 16,712 2.3 10,719 4.3 3,791 4.0above______
Total 1,031,928 - 714,680 - 251,370 - 94,703 -
T Encompasses the following: 1) those pursuing completion of the GED or other test-based high school equivalency diploma,
vocational school, or secondary school, etc; 2) those not attending high school and who are neither a high school graduate nor an
alternative high school credential holder; 3) one who is attending high school and is not yet a senior.
Figure 2-9: Education Level of Enlisted Applicants Who Received a Medical Examination in 2004-
2008 vs. 2009 [2]
2004 -2008 2009
AFQT score Applicants Accessions Applicants Accessions
Count % Count % Count % Count %
93 -99 58,351 5.7 42,241 5.9 17,256 6.9 6,592 7.0
65-92 362,850 35.4 261,860 36.7 95,699 38.2 37,369 39.5
50-64 266,876 26.0 186,863 26.2 66,134 26.4 25,220 26.7
30-49 308,309 30.0 210,829 29.5 67,801 27.1 24,938 26.4
11 - 29? 29,991 2.9 11,713 1.6 3,556 1.4 422 0.4
<11 637 - 21 - 82 - 7 -
Missing 4,914 - 1,153 842 - 155 -
Total 1.031,928 - 714,680 - 251,370 94,703 -
Individuals scoring in the 10 percentile or lower are prohibited from applying. However, some exceptions are apparent.
Figure 2-10: AFQT Score Categories of Enlisted Applicants Who Received a Medical Examination
in 2004-2008 vs. 2009 [2]
Table 2.3 summarizes and compares the information captured at accession against the known
documented risk factors for PTSD.
Table 2.3: Comparison of Factors Recorded at Accession and Pre-Traumatic Risk Factors
Accession Pre-Traumatic Risk
Education credentials Poorly educated
ASVAB scores
Item 16 and follow-up explanations Family instability/Childhood antisocial behavior
Physical health War-zone stressors
2.4.2 Training: Resilience Programs and Resources
The training phase of the lifecycle typically consists of basic combat training and other trainings
specific to the service member's desired career path (i.e. leadership training and other skills training
for specific military jobs) [10]. It is during this stage that all training, counseling and medical
evaluations are completed to ensure all service members and their families are ready for deployment.
In addition to basic combat and advanced individual trainings, readiness and resilience activities are
also performed during the training stage.
The Bacharach, et al. (2008) model indicates that the quality and availability of performance-
level resources attenuates distress level experienced resulting from work place critical incidents [12].
Although the resources discussed in Bacharach, et al. (2008)'s model focused primarily on material
resources like equipment to ensure firefighter readiness, this thesis will define unit-level perfor-
mance resources as resources to build internal resilience within the service member population in
an effort to ensure optimal service member performance, as described in Chapter 1.
An example of a unit-level resilience resource is the Army resilience program previously known
as Battlemind. Mandated in 2007, Battlemind Training was the Army's original resilience training
developed by the Walter Reed Institute of Research. Battlemind was incorporated into the Army's
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness resilience training program in 2009 and included deployment cy-
cle modules, lifecycle modules, and modules for medical personnel [16]. Army service members
who had attended pre-deployment Battlemind training (consisting of resiliency-building modules
both pre- and post-deployment) were significantly less likely to screen positive for a mental health
problem than those who had not attended (12 percent vs. 20.5 percent) [76].
In addition to discretionary funding designated to be spent by the services, the government di-
rects funding through DHP for creating external resilience resources to prevent and mitigate service
member stress resulting from combat exposure and other critical incidents. Each service receives
discretionary funding from the federal government, and service-specific resilience programs can
be a byproduct of this discretionary spending. A partial list of service-specific and service-wide
resilience resources can be found in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.
Table 2.4: Examples of Service-Specific Organizations and Programs Contributing to Resilience
Building (Adapted from [16])
Organizations & Programs Descriptions
Army Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Uses a balanced, multifaceted approach
combining individual assessment, tailored
virtual training, classroom training and
embedded resilience experts.
Navy Operational Stress Control (OSC) Led by Navy Medicine, goals are to build
resilience in Navy sailors, units and families
and decrease stigma associated with
psychological health issues.
Marine Corps Focuses on force preservation, mission
Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) readiness, and long-term health. Fully
integrated into unit and formal education and
active duty and Reserve training.
Airman Resilience Training (ART) Pre-exposure preparation and reintegration
education for deploying Air Force service
members. Structured into classes focusing on
deployment stress, environments, reactions,
prevention and seeking help.
Table 2.5: Examples of Service-Wide Organizations and Programs Contributing to Resilience Build-
ing (Adapted from [16])
Organizations & Programs Descriptions
Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological DCoE's Resilience and Prevention (R&P)
Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCoE) unit leads DCoE's resilience efforts,
including hosting an annual warrior
resilience conference.
Military OneSource A resilience-supporting program designed
by Military Community and Family Policy
(MC&FP) to be a "one-stop" resource for
service member and family assistance.
Yellow Ribbon Program Provides a range of resilience and
prevention education for National Guard
and Reserve service members and families.
2.4.3 Training: Pre-Deployment Health Assessment (PHA)
As mentioned, medical evaluations are completed during training to ensure that a service member
is fit to be deployed into combat. To fulfill this obligation, every service member is required to
complete the Pre-Deployment Health Assessment (PHA) within 60 days of expected deployment
date [98]. The PHA's purpose is to assess a service member's health prior to deployment, and asks
the service member to self-evaluate his or her physical and mental health; the complete form is then
evaluated by a health provider to ensure the service member can be properly diagnosed and receive
adequate care [97]. Examples of questions asked on the PHA that could be used to help evaluate
a service member's mental health include the following: "During the past year, have you sought
counseling or care for your mental health?" and "Do you currently have any questions or concerns
about your health?"
2.4.4 Deployment: In-Theater Diagnosis and Care
During deployment, if a service member feels as though he or she requires mental health care, there
are various resources in theater available for service members to be diagnosed and get support for
mental health problems, although a formal mental health assessment is not performed in theater
unless a service member seeks treatment [94]. Each military unit has access to multifaith chaplains
who offer nonclinical counseling, as well as access to treatment facilities in theater [94]. There are
also mental health practitioners embedded in operational units in theater; for example, the Marine
Corps utilize a program called the Operational Stress Control and Readiness Program (OSCAR)
to integrate mental health professionals at the regiment level to teach and guide Marines through
deployment [65, 94].
2.4.5 Post-Deployment: Health Assessments and Treatment
When a service member is scheduled to return from from deployment, a Post-Deployment Health
Assessment (PDHA) is conducted. The PDHA is a face-to-face health screening with a trained
health care practitioner which occurs in-theater during medical out-processing or within 30 days
upon returning to base [73]. The purpose of the PDHA is for a provider to review with a service
member any current health concerns, especially with regards to mental health or psychosocial issues
associated with deployment activities or any exposures to toxic materials during deployment [73].
Upon returning from deployment, a service member is required to complete the Post-Deployment
Civilian, Civilian, Civilian,
Condition(s) DoD Baseline Lower-Bound Upper-Bound
Evidence-Based Treatment
PTSD $1,374.48 $1,658.34 $1,334.70 $1,810.80
Major depression $585.56 $1,099.16 $568.75 $1,349.03
Co-morbid PTSD/ $1,392.73 $2,989.13 $1,352.95 $3,759.90
major depression
Usual Care
PTSD $298.19 $444.93 $289.58 $518.11
Major depression $239.57 $294.09 $232.38 $323.16
Co-morbid PTSD/ $298.19 $444.93 $289.58 $518.11
major depression
NOTE: The civilian baseline estimate assumes that 35 percent of discharged personnel get
care through the VA; the lower-bound estimate assumes that all discharged personnel get
care through the VA; and the upper-bound assumes that no discharged personnel get care
through the VA.
Figure 2-11: Estimated Treatment Costs for a Three-Month Course of Psychological Health Treat-
ment [94]
Health Reassessment (PDHRA) 90-180 days after deployment if he or she was deployed outside the
continental United States for 30 days or more [41].
Treatment options for service members in garrison are similar to those in theater. Service mem-
bers requiring treatment either because they have screened positively for a mental health disorder
or feel as though they need treatment for mental health issues can seek help from or be referred
to mental health care providers in garrison, at MTFs, or from providers outside of the TRICARE
network [94]. Alternatively, they can also seek services from post-deployment programs that may
or may not be sponsored by the DoD-an example is Military OneSource, described in Table 2.5.
Treatment costs vary depending on the services rendered and the network or organizations where
treatment was pursued. A study done by RAND (2008) to estimate and model the costs of treatment
for psychological health issues for military service members found that the cost of psychotherapy
and visits to primary care or psychological health providers were primarily reimbursed by TRI-
CARE (for active duty service members) and Medicare (for service members who have left the
DoD) [94]. Figure 2-11 summarizes the estimated treatment costs for a typical three-month course
of treatment as modeled by RAND (2008).
In early analysis of these lifecycle processes, it was noted that there was useful information
at each phase of the lifecycle that is not leveraged; for example, the dynamics of each enterprise
stakeholder (i.e. government, mental health care practitioners, service members) and their deci-
sion making processes are examined separately with little consideration to how they affect each
other [34]. These observations, in addition to what is known about the execution and focus of stake-
holders with regards to service member health care delivery, indicate that a systems view is critical
in revealing the underlying cause-effect relationships that can be leveraged to improve mental health
care delivery services in the enterprise. Further understanding of how a systems approach might be
used in solving the challenges of the military mental health care enterprise may be found in previous
applications of systems thinking to the challenges faced by the U.S. health care system at large.
This chapter has previously described the boundaries of the complex enterprise that this thesis is
concerned with, and has now discussed the relevant stakeholders, processes and interactions of this
research work. In addition, motivation for utilizing systems thinking to examine this enterprise has
been introduced. Now that we understand the enterprise of interest, the next section will provide
further insight as to why this thesis will be utilizing an enterprise systems approach to understand
the dynamics surrounding decision-making for mental health care delivery in the military.
2.5 Enterprise Systems Engineering and System Dynamics in Health
Care Delivery
An enterprise systems approach aims to identify key stakeholders, observe the interdependencies
among enterprise entities, including its organizations and processes, and understand the stability
and flow of enterprise entities [70]. This approach has been applied to the health care domain in re-
cent literature. Oliveira et al. (2010) utilized an enterprise systems approach to identify similarities
in processes like patient flow, hospital organization and strategy between leading hospitals in the
United States and the United Kingdom [78]. An extension of the enterprise systems approach was
seen in an adaptation of the Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool (LESAT) for health care organi-
zations; LESAT is a tool originally created based on lean enterprise principles to gauge how "lean"
an organization is and its readiness to change [42]. Further support for using a systems approach
to analyze health care systems is found in Rouse (2008). Rouse (2008) provides a foundation for
utilizing systems thinking in studying health care systems, as health care systems are complex adap-
tive systems that require the incentivizing of outcomes and wellness for optimal performance [87].
Thus, Section 2.5.1 will describe recent work and further motivation for utilizing systems thinking
in health care delivery as a foundation for this thesis research.
2.5.1 Systems Thinking in Health Care Delivery
In recent years, the U.S. health care system has seen escalating costs in delivering patient care that
has been attributed to the relative fragmentation of the system; unfortunately, limited technical and
intellectual capital has been employed to improve or optimize the operations of the U.S. health care
systems or in assessing its performance to date [74]. The National Academy of Engineering and
Institute of Medicine also found that further complicating efforts to improve the delivery of health
care in the United States has been the complexity of the issues surrounding the health care system,
such as the effects of rapid advances in medical technology; the incentive structure of the U.S.
health care and insurance markets; and the underinvestment in information technologies [74]. An
approach that considers the health care system holistically and analyzes all system entities and their
effects may aid in the examination of complex issues surrounding health care delivery in order to
develop robust recommendations for optimal system quality and performance.
The shift towards using systems thinking to improve the U.S. health care system occurred in
2001, when the Institute of Medicine put forth the following quality characteristics that would de-
scribe a high performing, transformed, patient-centered health care system (Figure 2-12):
" "Safe-avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help them
" Effective-providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could benefit and re-
fraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit (avoiding underuse and overuse,
respectively)
" Patient-centered-providing care that is respectful of and responsive to individual patient pref-
erences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient values guide all clinical decisions
" Timely-reducing waiting times and sometimes harmful delays for those who receive and
those who give care
" Efficient-avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas and energy
" Equitable-providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal characteristics,
such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and socioeconomic status" [74, p. 14-15]
Based on these quality characteristics, a partnership between the National Academy of Engi-
neering and the Institute of Medicine was established to use systems thinking and systems engi-
neering tools to tackle the systemic problems in health care delivery. This partnership identified
Safe
Effective
Patient-Centered
Timely
Efficient
Equitable
Figure 2-12: Six Interrelated Dimensions of Quality for a Transformed Health Care System [74].
modeling and simulation as a promising area that would benefit from using these tools to transform
health care delivery, and recommended that research on the organizational, economic and policy-
related barriers to utilizing systems engineering tools in health care be an integral part of the future
research agenda at large [74]. The National Academy of Engineering and the DoD also concurrently
identified the system of care for psychological health in the military and in particular, for traumatic
brain injury (TBI) as an area in MHS which could benefit from the use of systems engineering tools
for transformation [75]. Accordingly, this thesis will utilize a systems thinking tool to identify areas
in military psychological health care delivery that could be considered for transformation.
2.5.2 Applications of System Dynamics in Health Care: A Preliminary Systematic
Literature Review
System dynamics is a method to enhance learning in complex systems which deals with the sys-
tem's dynamic complexity and used to inform potential policy resistance [90]. For example, it has
been used to model topics such as political instability, building material resource availability, land
reclamation in the mining industry, energy and power systems, coastal ecosystem dynamics, avia-
tion systems, and agenda setting and public policy making [95]. An area in which system dynamics
has emerged as a widely accepted research method is health care systems. In order to understand
and summarize the existing literature, a preliminary systematic literature review was performed (see
Table 2.6). The total number of publications that use system dynamics to study health care systems
questions remains relatively little. A literature search in Google Scholar with the keywords "system
Table 2.6: Preliminary Systematic Literature Review Protocol
Purposes of this Systematic Literature Review To identify and review prior work
performed using system dynamics to
illustrate potential policy effects in health
care and public health.
Search Strategy Search selected databases with specific
keywords.
Remove duplicates.
Exclusion Criteria Studies were excluded if the majority of the
study did not address the application of
system dynamics to health care processes
or public health outcomes.
Keywords "system dynamics" AND "health"
"system dynamics" AND "healthcare"
Databases/Journals Google Scholar
(injournal: System Dynamics Review;
anywhere in text)
MIT DSpace (Master's-level theses;
in abstract)
dynamics" and "health" and "system dynamics" and "healthcare" within the journal System Dynam-
ics Review generated 123 titles. After utilizing the exclusion criteria, 14 search results remained for
review. The same search within the MIT DSpace database for Master's-level theses showed only six
theses and utilizing the exclusion criteria then produced a final list of three MIT theses. Therefore,
the total number of titles reviewed was 17.
Koelling and Schwandt (2005) reviewed and summarized literature which utilized system dy-
namics in health systems, including applications to the organization of health systems, clinical re-
search, delivery, disease prevention, epidemiology and dentistry. They found that research interest
in health systems was increasing, especially with regards to health care systems, demonstrating a fo-
cus on individual or population health issues [56]. Koelling and Schwandt (2005) also emphasized
the use of system dynamics as a modeling tool for health care systems as integrated policies affect-
ing multiple stakeholders can be effectively modeled, resulting in broad improvements at the system
level [56]. The preliminary literature review done for this thesis additionally found that much of the
prior work done with system dynamics in health care outside of the MIT thesis domain primarily
illustrated health care issues at the national level, and focused on modeling national level systems
for scenario planning in various contexts. A summary of relevant studies and their categories can
be found in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Summary
Category References
Scenario Planning at the National Level Homer (2006); Royston (1999);
Wolstenholme (1999); van Ackere (1999);
Gonzilez-Busto (1999); Homer (2004);
Dangerfield (200 1); Hirsch (1999);
Lane (2000)
Policy Creation to Drive Health Outcomes Cavana (1999); Wolstenholme (2007);
Homer (2007); Ritchie-Dunham (1999)
Consequences of Technology and Innovation Bayer (2007); Lin (2007); Newkirk (2009);
Implementation in Health Care Couturier (2010)
Scenario Planning at the National Level
System dynamics has been used to model multiple interacting diseases and risks, demonstrate the
interaction of delivery systems and diseased populations, and illustrate potential matters of national
and state policy [47, 27]. For example, Homer, et al. (2004) utilized system dynamics to project
the costs and benefits of a program designed to improve chronic care in a county of Washington
state, as chronic care was widely considered to be wasteful and unresponsive to patient needs [46].
Most importantly, this system dynamics model demonstrated the value of system dynamics model-
ing to enable leadership to better design policies based on projected critical success factors, system
limitations and predicted outcomes. Hirsch and Immediato (1999) also utilized system dynamics
models to help decision-makers think about how to implement new initiatives and changes based on
large-scale policy changes affecting a health care system at large [43]. This study demonstrated that
the value in building a system dynamics model lay in the model's ability to support sensitivity anal-
yses for scenario planning, reveal potential time delays, and test scenarios that would not otherwise
be pursued in the real world [43]. This directly supported Koelling and Schwandt (2005)'s work
which additionally showed these strengths of system dynamics versus other methods like discrete
event simulation [56]. Other studies have also explored potential scenario outcomes by using sys-
tem dynamics to illustrate the effects that waiting lists have on health care delivery in two different
national health care systems, the UK National Health Service (NHS) and Spain's National Health
Service, eventually enabling robust data-driven recommendations to counter predicted long-term
policy impacts [104, 35].
Further motivation for using system dynamics as a method for modeling stress reactions and
their effects on mental health care in the military can be found in Royston, et al. (1999) and Wol-
of Literature Review
stenholme (1999). It was found that system dynamics modeling proved useful in several areas of
health care policy and program development and implementation in England, especially in the areas
of assessing public health risks; screening for disease, managing waits for hospital treatment, plan-
ning the health care workforce, and developing emergency health and social care [89]. There was
an emphasis placed on the future potential of system dynamics for exploiting the potential synergy
between systems thinking and scenario planning [89], both of which provide motivation for this
thesis work. A stock and flow model of total patient flow was used to test alternative initiatives
for improving the United Kingdom health system and showed that system dynamics could be used
to create a national-level, quantitative analysis of health care systems [107]. Because the military
health system is also a national-level health care system, a stock and flow model can also be ap-
plied to the service member lifecycle flow, enabling a potential quantitative analysis of the system
to inform policy planning in the military health system as well.
Factors in Policy Creation to Drive Health Outcomes
Lane, et al. (2000) utilized system dynamics to model the interactions between hospital demand,
accident & emergency (A&E) resource allocation, other processes, and bed numbers, and the find-
ings carried a significant policy implication that could be applied to this thesis research. While some
delays were unavoidable in A&E units, waiting time reductions could be achieved by selective aug-
mentation of resources within and related to the A&E units [58]. Similarly, this thesis explores
whether or not selective allocation of resources related to psychological health in the military may
have a beneficial impact on the delivery of mental health care in the military. The influence of delays
in military mental health care delivery will also be explored.
System dynamics modeling exercises were used to illustrate the different priorities and per-
spectives of different health care stakeholder groups, which showed that these different stakeholder
priorities and perspectives inadvertently influence policy creation and the eventual quality of health
care services, leading to suboptimal health outcomes [23, 108]. Cavana, et al. (1999) led a system
dynamics exercise among groups that combined clinicians, policy drafters, managers, scientists and
economists and found that each stakeholder group held different views regarding the inefficiencies
and causes of health inequalities in the New Zealand Ministry of Health, showing the importance
of a holistic systems thinking approach to policy creation for driving health outcomes [23]. Simi-
larly, Wolstenholme, et al. (2007) demonstrated how mismatches between how management views
organizational performance and actual behavior leads to unintended negative consequences for pa-
tient care via informal coping policies, and additionally argues for the investigation of sustainable
policies downstream to alleviate the upstream problems perpetuating these informal coping poli-
cies [108]. In contrast, other system dynamics models illustrated how upstream initiatives had a
large impact on chronic illness prevalence with regards to risk factor mitigation, patient behaviors
and living conditions, as well as on preventing public health crises and epidemics [45, 85]. Sim-
ilarly, this thesis will follow these works by considering upstream initiatives based on the health
information assessed at military accession, and how this knowledge might be utilized in upstream
initiatives to ensure optimal mental health outcomes in the military population downstream. As the
literature has also shown the value in considering all stakeholder perspectives in creating a system
dynamics model of the enterprise of interest, this work also will be taking a holistic perspective in
its qualitative assessment of stakeholder interactions in military mental health care delivery.
Consequences of Technology and Innovation Implementation in Health Care
Recent literature has begun to focus on the consequences of implementing new technologies and
innovations in health care, from screening practices to advances in health information technolo-
gies [59, 14]. Other work has also focused on how the U.S. health care landscape may have influ-
enced and perpetuated breakdowns in drug safety [25] and examined innovations in health programs
on a global scale in the developing world [68]. All of these works demonstrated the value of system
dynamics in revealing unanticipated negative side effects from these technologies and innovations,
and especially from the policies which emerged to regulate them. Lin (2007) used system dynam-
ics to illustrate how increased and improved screening practices from revised diabetes guidelines
perpetuated the increase of diabetes prevalence in the United States, because these practices were
better able to diagnose cases which otherwise would have gone untreated [59]. The system dynam-
ics model in Couturier (2010) showed how the behaviors of inherent stakeholders like clinicians and
pharmaceutical salespeople assisted in the approval of the drug Vioxx without adequate oversight
over its safety [25]. Finally, both Newkirk (2009) and Bayer (2007) investigated the impacts of sep-
arate innovations in the health care sphere (disease-focused global health aid programs vs. telecare).
Using system dynamics models, both of these studies revealed that the impact of these innovations
must be carefully assessed over time, and indicated levers that could be adjusted to ensure optimal
performance in their respective contexts. In the context of military mental health care delivery, re-
silience programs and resources can also be considered an implementation of innovation, and their
impact on overall health outcomes will also be investigated using system dynamics.
Summary of Literature Review
This preliminary literature review has illustrated that system dynamics is emerging as a method to
study complex systems in health care, ranging from delivery systems to the regulatory system sur-
rounding drug approval in the United States. More specifically, system dynamics has been utilized
to aid scenario planning for national health care systems, to identify the drivers behind population
health outcomes and the performance of health care services, and to demonstrate potential positive
and negative consequences of implementing new technologies and innovations to improve health
care systems at large. As a complex national health care system that is concerned with the health
outcomes of a large population (military service members) and is currently investigating the use of
new technology like telemental health care for implementation, this preliminary literature review
provides support for the application of system dynamics to study the military mental health care
enterprise.
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Chapter 3
Methods
Now that the enterprise has been defined and the problem statement has been described in its rele-
vant context, this chapter will outline the research methods used to achieve the research objectives
described in Section 1.2. Section 3.1 will again emphasize the systems thinking approach, leading
into a discussion of system dynamics as a tool for guiding systems thinking in Section 3.2. The sys-
tem dynamics model of the military mental health enterprise is introduced in Section 3.3, followed
by its assumptions in Section 3.4. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the qualitative
and quantitative methods utilized for data collection and analysis.
3.1 Value of Systems Thinking
In taking a systems approach to these challenges in military mental health care delivery, it is im-
portant not only to consider factors at accession that may influence subsequent decision-making
throughout the military service lifecycle, but also the overall dynamics of policy implementation
and how policy effects may cascade throughout the system. As referenced in Chapter 2, the focus of
enterprise-level organizations, leadership, and decisions have a profound influence on the individ-
ual service member. Processes across the lifecycle require examination across the entire lifecycle.
Similarly, decision-making and their resulting dynamics across the enterprise exert influence over
the entire lifecycle as well (Figure 3-1). Adding complexity to the decision-making process is that
cause-effect relationships across lifecycle phases may not be inherently obvious to key stakehold-
ers; in a time of crisis and war when decisions and policies need to be formulated and implemented
quickly, it may be difficult to see how effects from decisions may affect the entire enterprise as a
whole.
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Figure 3-1: Influence of Decision-Making Dynamics across the Lifecycle
3.2 System Dynamics: Tools for Systems Thinking
As illustrated in Section 2.5.2, the usefulness of system dynamics as a framework for opera-
tions management and management science has been demonstrated in recent literature. Gr68ler et
al. (2008) found that although feedback loops, accumulation processes and delays exist and are
widespread in operations management, these phenomena are often overlooked or not considered,
rendering system dynamics extremely powerful in examining the structural aspects of operations
management such as supply chains and improvement programs in operations [39]. Furthermore,
system dynamics model simulations allow the social scientist to experiment with the model, en-
abling real-world applicability and the demonstration of policy implications when real-world testing
is not feasible or appropriate. Perhaps most importantly, system dynamics can be used to examine
unanticipated side effects and feedbacks that may occur as a result of policy implementation, render-
ing it a valuable tool for this thesis and its policy implications and recommendations (Figure 3-2).
System dynamics uses two different tools for modeling a complex system: causal loop diagrams
and stock and flow diagrams.
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Our decisions alter our environment, leading to new decisions,
Decisions
Side
Goals Effects
Environment
Goals of
Other
Agents Actions of
Others
but also triggering side effects, delayed reactions, changes
in goals and interventions by others. These feedbacks may
lead to unanticipated results and ineffective policies.
Figure 3-2: System Dynamics: the feedback view [90]
3.2.1 Causal Loop Diagrams
Causal loop diagrams illustrate a causal relationship between two variables [90]. For example,
Figure 3-3 illustrates a positive causal relationship between birth rate and population-as the birth
rate increases, population increases; as the birth rate decreases, population always decreases. A
positive causal relationship, therefore, is one that illustrates two variables changing in the same
direction. A negative causal relationship, in which two variables are moving in opposite directions,
is also illustrated in Figure 3-3. As the death rate increases, the population decreases. Note that in
this example, birth and death rates refer to the number of people born or that die per time period,
whereas the fractional birth or death rate is the actual birth or death rate of any given year. To
illustrate, an unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of unemployed people to the labor force
(i.e. 9 percent). A fractional unemployment rate would be 9 percent per year.
Feedback loops illustrated in Figure 3-3 show a reinforcing feedback loop between variables
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Figure 3-3: Causal loop diagram notation [90]
Birth Rate and Population, whereas variables Death Rate and Population Rate form a balancing
feedback loop. A reinforcing feedback loop like the one shown between Birth Rate and Population
indicates that as the birth rate increases, population also increases. As population increases, birth
rate increases, reinforcing the behavior and thus the loop is a reinforcing loop. In contrast, as the
death rate increases, the population decreases, and because variables Population and Death have a
positive causal relationship, as the population decreases, the death rate also decreases. The feedback
effect opposes the initial change so the loop is balancing.
The value of causal loop diagrams is in their ability to demonstrate important feedback mecha-
nisms throughout the system. However, a major limitation of causal loop diagrams is their inability
to illustrate the accumulation and depletion of various system variables and how these variables
might change over time.
3.2.2 Stock and Flow Diagrams
Stock and flow diagrams illustrate how accumulations of a variable move through a complex system
[90]. They depict the state of the system and provide information for the basis of decision-making,
making them a powerful tool for analysis and for determining potential policy implications. Fur-
thermore, stock and flow diagrams leverage time by providing insight into how the passage of time
affects the overall system-since stocks cannot accumulate or deplet.e without associated flows, over
time a stock will continue to accumulate unless an action is taken on its inflow and outflow.
System dynamics depicts stocks as rectangles, inflows are represented with pipes pointing into
the stock and outflows with pipes pointing out of the stock. Flows are controlled by valves and
clouds represent the sources and sinks of flows which lie outside of the complex system of interest.
Figure 3-4 illustrates this concept-as flow Birth Rate increases, the stock Population accumulates;
as flow Death Rate increases, stock Population decreases.
Population _ _ _ _
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Figure 3-4: Stock and flow diagramming notation [90]
3.3 System Dynamics Model of the Military Mental Health Enterprise
A system dynamics model (Appendix B) of the military mental health enterprise was created, with
causal loop and stock and flow diagrams, to understand the various decisions, interactions and
policies that resulted in the rise of PTSD as an enduring pathology of OIF/OEF as discussed in
Section 1.2. The stock and flow diagrams modeling the military service member lifecycle illustrates
the effect that the waiver process and deployment rates have on the overall lifecycle, and validates
external observations seen by other studies (i.e. [94]). As leadership and policymakers work to
alleviate imminent concerns like operational demand, the model additionally demonstrates how
feedback effects from these policies may linger for years to come as the feedbacks are perpetuated
through the multiple levels of the enterprise. The waiver process and deployment rates are examples
of enterprise-level policies that affect the unit and eventual health outcomes on the individual level,
showing how the model illustrates the importance of a multi-level approach in outlining a long-term
psychological health care strategy for the enterprise.
3.4 Model Assumptions
Limitations of this research have been previously discussed in Section 1.4. To reiterate, this re-
search did not attempt to study all types of service members and all psychological health processes
throughout the military service lifecycle; nor did it attempt to study all possible scenarios potentially
experienced by a service member. Furthermore, most unit-level and enterprise-level dynamics were
not quantified due to limitations with data collection and retrieval.
Additional model assumptions include:
1. The system dynamics model assumes that all rates are constant throughout the year because
the model's defined time step is one year. For example, the model assumes a constant base
fractional deployment rate at 12 percent per fiscal year. Assuming that rates remain constant
allows the model's sensitivity analyses to project a general picture of future health outcomes
for informing future policy recommendations. However, the downside of assuming constant
rates in this model is that this is likely not the case in reality. It would be more practical
to define the model's time step by month to better capture the deployment data which tracks
changes in troop numbers per month (i.e., in [15]) and gain higher resolution of the dynamics,
but data provided by AMSARA is defined and tracked by fiscal year. With the fractional
deployment rate example, deployment rate will likely vary throughout the year based on the
demands of the operation (i.e. lengthening of deployment cycles, as was seen in OIF/OEF),
or could change based on staffing needs. The model does account for operational demand and
its effect on the fractional deployment rate, but this causal relationship has not been quantified
to the extent that exact deployment rates can be predicted based on incremental changes in
operational demand.
2. Although the model accounts for operational demand and changes in deployment rate by
testing the salience of deployment rates on future health outcomes over time, the model does
not account for individual differences in deployment assignments due to the limitations of
system dynamics as a method. For example, the literature indicates that the cumulative effect
of multiple deployments and lengthened deployment cycles is manifested in the increased
onset of PTSD symptoms over time (i.e. [94, 15]). However, the model is unable to track
individual differences in the number of deployment cycles served, or track which individual
service members have had lengthened deployment cycles. This is because system dynamics
aggregates service members in stocks to produce a continuous function by which conclusions
can be drawn regarding the population at large. Therefore, although the model does illustrate
that a service member can deploy into theater, return, and be deployed again, it does not
distinguish between service members who are on their first deployment in theater and service
members who may have served multiple deployments and are being deployed again.
3. The model assumes rates are constant across the entire lifecycle for all service members,
mostly due to the general lack of available data for some rates (i.e. deployment and accession
rates for the National Guard service members). For example, the model assumes that the rate
at which National Guard and Reserve service members are deployed would be the same as
the rate at which active duty service members are deployed. Similarly, the model assumes
that the rate at which service members experience an onset of PTSD symptoms in theater is
the same as the rate in which service members experience an onset of PTSD symptoms in
garrison. Assuming constant rates across the entire lifecycle for all service members again
enables the generalization of the model findings across the entire service member population.
In reality, initial deployment rates for active duty and National Guard and Reserve Corps ser-
vice members are likely not the same because National Guard and Reserve service members
would be deployed in the event that service members additional to the active duty force are
required to support forces in theater. Deploy again rates, where service members are assigned
back into theater, may not be the same as initial deployment rates. This might be due to sce-
narios such as service members not having yet been cleared for deployment, service members
being medically discharged, or even service members dropping out of the service. Similarly,
rates for the onset, diagnosis and treatment of PTSD were assumed to be constant in theater
and in garrison. Previously discussed in Section 2.1.2 were the military-specific risk factors
found by Phillips, et al. (2010) and King, et al. (1999). Because of the extreme stressors
service members might experience in theater, it could be posited that onset, diagnosis and
treatment rates might be different in theater than in garrison. Resources for psychological
health in theater might also be allocated differently, affecting these rates as well. Further-
more, it could be argued that assuming constant rates across the entire lifecycle would lead to
overgeneralization of the model findings. It may be beneficial to consider outliers and other
unique individual service member characteristics, as they could inform policy for specific
populations within the overall service member population.
4. There is a distinction made between service members who are diagnosed in garrison and
service members who are diagnosed in theater. However, when service members diagnosed in
garrison are deployed again into theater, they re-enter the stock of deployed service members
and do not enter the stock of deployed diagnosed service members because they were not
previously diagnosed in theater.
5. The model assumes that as a service member deploys, another service member returns be-
cause every service member is given a set of deployment dates that correspond to a deploy-
ment cycle typically lasting 12 months for every two years outside of combat [94]. The effect
this assumption has on the model simulations is exemplified by equaling fractional deploy-
ment rates and fractional return rates. As with deployment rates, return rates are likely to
vary over time and are likely to be dependent on the demands of the combat operation. Sys-
tem dynamics also does not allow the model to consider discrete deployment events. This
model's defined time step is one year; regardless of the deployment events that occur during
this year, it will always implement the defined number of service members into the system
at a constant flow per year. For example, if the model were to specify that 100,000 service
members enter the system per year, a total of 100,000 service members will enter the system
each year regardless of how they are distributed over that year. Furthermore, other work has
also indicated that the rate of deployment per unit is only one way to examine the burden of
deployment because the make-up of a unit changes as individuals are reassigned or replaced
[15].
6. Qualitative interview data, described in Section 3.5, indicates that the definition of resilience
is not mutually agreed upon among enterprise stakeholders as the relationship between stress
and resilience may vary on an individual basis. The model therefore assumes that individual-
level factors refer to factors affecting the entire service member population at large to again
provide for generalization of the model findings.
7. The model starts at year zero with initial stock values as assigned from the literature (if ap-
plicable). As a result, all service members after year zero must then enter the system through
application and accession, providing a realistic depiction of the military service member life-
cycle at large. As discussed in Section 2.4, all service members must apply and be accepted
into the military. The model additionally assumes that all applicants enter the system without
already having been diagnosed with PTSD and without having received prior treatment for
PTSD. In other words, service members only receive a diagnosis of and treatment for PTSD
as they progress through the stock and flow diagram. Although it is unlikely that all applicants
would enter the system without already having been diagnosed with PTSD, the likelihood that
this would be the case would be extremely small, as the accession processes described in Sec-
tion 2.4 are designed to screen applicants who previously suffered from psychological health
issues. Even though these applicants may appear in the system as a successful applicant (a
Type II error) or a waiver acceptance, the effect that these members would have on the overall
dynamics is likely very small.
8. The model assumes that combat operations are ongoing throughout the duration of sensitivity
analyses, without interruption. This is due to the utilization of system dynamics as a method,
as it aggregates population data and utilizes a continuous function to generate reasonable
conclusions. The incorporation of delay levers, as well as table functions, allows system
dynamics to consider discontinuous functions and would strengthen the model overall. The
addition of table functions and delay levers were considered but were eventually not used due
to the lack of quantitative data for the variables of interest.
3.5 Data Sources and Model Validation: Qualitative Methods
The model was created based on the literature review described earlier in Chapter 2 and validated
with qualitative interview data from interviews conducted with six individuals involved with mili-
tary service lines, service medical commands and military accession policy, as well as individuals at
the Defense Centers of Excellence (DCoE), the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD-HA). Interviews conducted with individuals out-
side of the services implies that the group the participant represented offered its services across the
military service lines and commands, and are not specific to any given military service line. Collect-
ing qualitative data in conjunction with quantitative data analysis to triangulate research findings is
advantageous because it can result in well validated and substantiated findings [26].
Interviews were designed to last for approximately 30 minutes to one hour and required no pre-
vious preparation on the part of the participant. However, preliminary material such as an outline of
the literature review and research purpose and the preliminary model discussed in Chapter 1 were
provided to the participant prior to the interview if the participant wished to gain some preliminary
background insight as to the research being conducted and the research questions posed. The inter-
view format was unstructured and followed an open-ended approach in which the participant could
provide anecdotes and examples from his or her own personal experiences. There was no stan-
dard interview guide due to the varying roles that all participants played in the enterprise; however,
questions typically followed a variation of the format below:
1. Basic Information about Author and Research Supervisor
2. Introduction and Discussion of Preliminary Research Model
3. Participant's Insights on the Processes or Key Individual-, Unit-, and Enterprise-Level Dy-
namics in the Research Model
Depending on the role that the participant played in the enterprise, additional information was
garnered. For example, if a participant played a large role in the development of a resilience program
or had expertise regarding a specific program or process, the interview questions were primarily
structured to allow the participant to describe his or her role in the context of that specific program
or process. If necessary, interviews typically ended with a request for supplementary documentation
for the program or process that the participant represented, Qualitative data from these interviews
were used and summarized to support key findings of this research in the form of quotations and
interspersed throughout as illustrations of key insights. These insights will be discussed in Chapter
4.
3.6 Data Sources and Model Validation: Quantitative Analysis
VensimPLE, a system dynamics software capable of developing and analyzing high level feedback
models, was used to build and design the system dynamics model and perform sensitivity analy-
ses. Available published data regarding service member deployment and PTSD symptoms reported
from Belasco (2009) and RAND (2008), as well as service member accession data from the Acces-
sion Medical Standards Analysis & Research Activity (AMSARA) 2010 Annual Report was used
to populate and quantitatively validate the stock and flow lifecycle diagram (Appendix C) before
proceeding to hypothesis testing. A summary of values is provided in Table 3.1, and these values
were defined as the "Current" condition in all sensitivity analyses unless otherwise stated. As stated
previously in Section 3.4, unless otherwise specified all fractional process rates (i.e. Fractional Ac-
cession Rate) were held constant across the entire military lifecycle regardless of service affiliation
or deployment status.
Table 3.1: Summary of Model Values
Source Variables Values Units
Military Service Applicants 251,370 Service Members
Accepted Military Service Members 234,547
20A a Applicants Granted Health Waivers1  16,823
2010 AnnApplicants Eligible for Health Waivers 27,421
Accepted Reserve Service Members 45,683
Accepted Guard Service Members 56,866
Fractional Accession Rate2  0.593 Unitless
AMSARA Fractional Waiver Approval Rate 0.614
2010 Annual Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate 0.386
Report Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate 0.109
Fractional Waiver Acceptance Rate3  0.394
Belasco (2009) Service Members Deployed 186,300 Service Members
Fractional Deployment Rate 0.12 Unitless
RAND (2008)
Fractional Diagnosis Rate4
Fractional Onset Rate 5
Fractional Treatment Rate
0.25
0.26
0.30
Unitless
Applicants who receive a permanent medical disqualification are eligible for waivers, in contrast to temporary dis-
qualifications which cover medical conditions such as being overweight [2].
2No accession rate was given for Guard or Reserves.
3Applicants who received waivers and accessed within one year of application. Regulations state that accessions must
occur within one year of application, although it is fairly common for applicants to request and be granted a one-year
extension [2]. For simplification purposes, this model considered all accessions to occur within one year as per the
regulations.
4 RAND (2008) found that the diagnosis rate for any given fiscal year ranges from 10-31 percent depending on the
study and methods used. 25 percent was chosen as the value used for this model based on a model sensitivity analysis
performed predicting an incidental percent change in diagnosed service members between 25-31 percent compared to
the range of 10-25 percent (5 percent vs. 5 1 percent). A diagnosis rate of 25 percent was therefore considered a good
estimate of the upper bound of predicted diagnosed service members.
5This fractional onset rate is considered to be underreported, as it only reports the percentage of service members who
seek psychological health treatment without being formally diagnosed [94].
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Chapter 4
Findings and Discussion
4.1 Overview of Findings
This section discusses the findings produced from the sensitivity analyses conducted using the sys-
tem dynamics model created as described in Section 3.3. Section 4.2 discusses the individual-level
dynamics of a typical service member progressing through the military service lifecycle from ac-
cession to treatment. Next, Section 4.3 describes the unit-level dynamics and specifically discusses
how unit-level resources like service-specific resilience training changes overall service member
dynamics, especially the predicted number of service members reporting PTSD symptoms. Section
4.4 explains how policymaking at an enterprise-level regarding screening and treatment processes
and providing funding for resilience resources in the context of increasing operational demand af-
fects all levels of dynamics in the enterprise. These sections provide the context for potential policy
implementation and set the foundation for a discussion of policy implications to be considered by
military leadership. Figure 4-1 summarizes the enterprise-level, unit-level and individual-level dy-
namics that will be explained in this chapter.
4.2 Individual-level Dynamics
4.2.1 Military Service Member Flow from Accession to Treatment
Appendix C shows the stock and flow diagram for service member movement from accession to
treatment. It shows the major routes by which service members flow through the military life cy-
cle. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, this thesis defines the enterprise as containing all organizations
* Preventative Screening - Operational Demand
Intended Prevention Effect: 
- Post-Trauma Diagnosis and Treatment
e DHP-Funded Resilience
Resources Enterprise-Level Dynamics
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Military Service Member Flow from Accession to Treatment
- Stress, Resilience and Risk Factor Influence
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Figure 4-1: Summary of dynamics discussed in this chapter.
related to mental health care from accession to treatment. Although community organizations and
organizations related to the VA do offer PTSD and mental health services for military service mem-
bers beyond deployment and treatment (i.e. reintegration into civilian society), they do not have
formal connections with other organizations within the enterprise and as a result this thesis is not
considering lifecycle processes beyond treatment. Typically, active duty service members enter
military service by applying and going through the accession processes at the MEPS (described in
Section 2.4). However, there are other routes by which service members may access into military
service. For example, the waiver-granting process described in Section 2.4 provides another route
for active duty service members to access into the service. Additionally, National Guard and Re-
serve Corps members have separate application processes, although they also go through the same
MEPS processes as active duty members.
The processes that architect this stock and flow diagram were previously described in Section
2.4. Military service members who access into military service are eventually deployed in theater
and return to their home base assignments after a period of deployment. Service members are either
deployed again or stay at their home base. Service members who begin to experience symptoms of
stress reactions and PTSD are eventually diagnosed and treated. It should be noted that although
service members may not have been formally diagnosed with a stress disorder, they may still seek
treatment or counseling. In addition, service members who experience an onset of symptoms may
not be diagnosed and may be deployed again without diagnosis or treatment.
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Figure 4-2: Balancing loop relationship between service member stress, resilience and post-
traumatic growth.
4.2.2 Stress, Resilience and Risk Factor Influence
Service member resilience, defined as the ability to withstand, recover, grow and adapt under chal-
lenging conditions, is currently considered by the military as critical to managing service member
stress; without resilience, service member performance suffers and the more stress a service member
experiences, the more his or her ability to withstand that stress decreases, even with prior resilience
training [ 13]. Additionally, the literature suggests that the experience of distress can lead to a over-
all positive experience, allowing the affected persons to become more self-sufficient and increasing
coping mechanisms that lead to overall post traumatic growth [20, 60]. A study of 1,287 American
war veterans found that the higher the amount of combat exposure, the more likely the veterans
were to perceive their military experience as positive [4]. The relationship between service member
stress, resilience and the amount of post traumatic growth can be therefore modeled as a balancing
loop, with post traumatic growth serving as a vehicle for increasing service member resilience to
combat stress (Figure 4-2).
Adding complexity to the stress-resilience relationship is the influence pre-traumatic risk factors
have in affecting the likelihood of an individual experiencing post-traumatic stress, previously dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.2. In applying the stress-resilience individual-level dynamics, service member
resilience should mitigate the influence of an individual's risk factors and an individual's predisposi-
tion to development of post-traumatic stress from factors such as a history of prior mental illness or
a lack of family and social support [54]. Factors building resilience such as a strong social support
network and education would also serve to mitigate service member stress by supporting a service
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Figure 4-3: Effect of unit support and leadership on the resilience balancing loop.
member's resilience building efforts. Now we will discuss the unit and enterprise-level dynamics
that influence these individual-level dynamics.
4.3 Unit-level Dynamics
4.3.1 Unit Leadership and Support
Section 2.2 previously described the importance of the military culture in providing an internal
social support to service members during their time in service. Additionally discussed were the
effect that good unit leadership and support might have in helping service members cope with stress
resulting from their time and experiences in the military service, and how leadership and support
would serve to mitigate the stigma previously associated with seeking mental health care in the
military. Thus, unit leadership and support should serve to mitigate any risk factor influence that
would predispose an individual to developing psychological health issues downstream during their
time in service, and further contribute to the balancing loop dynamics of the stress-post traumatic
growth-resilience relationship (Figure 4-3).
A study done among Air Force medical personnel to examine the relationship between unit
cohesion, stress exposure and PTSD indicated a significant linear correlation between unit cohesion
Bl"
Resilienice
and the severity of PTSD symptoms (r = -0.30, p < 0.01) [29]. In this study, unit cohesion was
measured using a 5-item, rationally derived measure similar to a study done by Brailey, et al. (2007)
with internal reliability of a = 0.82 [17]. The Brailey, et al. (2007) study measured unit cohesion
using items from the Deployment Social Support Scale of the Deployment Risk and Resilience
Inventory, a set of scales developed and validated to assess 14 key deployment-related risk and
resilience factors with significant implications for long-term health outcomes [55]. Sample items
included: "To what extent is your unit like a family to you", and "How good are the available role
models and leaders in your unit?" Participants were asked to respond to items using a 5-point scale
ranging from "not at all" to "extremely."
Based on these findings, causal relationships between variables Unit Support and Fractional
Onset Rate and Unit Support and Fractional Deployed Onset Rate were added to the stock and flow
diagram (see Appendix D). The baseline onset rate as defined by RAND (2008) was 26 percent.
Averaging the mean unit cohesion score between male and female groups in the Dickstein, et al.
(2010) study (12.60 and 11.67, respectively) and accounting for the five-item survey by dividing by
5 generated a mean unit cohesion score of 2.427 for a service member population for the baseline
"Current" condition. Because the Dickstein, et al. (2010) study found that the interaction between
unit cohesion and PTSD symptoms was a significant inverse linear relationship, a meta-analysis was
performed to determine the predicted mean unit cohesion score for the Brailey, et al. (2007) study
as shown below:
r Unit Cohesion Score
-0.30 [29] 2.427
-0.32 [17] x
-0.30x = -0.32 * 2.427
x = 2.59
The percent change in mean unit cohesion scores was calculated to determine the predicted
onset rate for the mean unit cohesion score of 2.59:
2.59 - 2.427 0.163, % change = 6%
0.06 * 0.26 = 0.0156
0.26 - 0.0156 = 0.24
Predicted onset rate = 0.24
An equation for variables Fractional Onset Rate and Fractional Deployed Onset Rate was then
defined using Microsoft Excel:
Fractional Onset Rate = -0.122 x Unit Support + 0.56
Fractional Deployed Onset Rate = -0.122 x Unit Support + 0.56
Following both the Dickstein, et al. (2010) and Brailey, et al. (2007) studies, Unit Support was
also defined on a range of 1-5 and a sensitivity analysis was performed accordingly. Sensitivity
analysis results both validated and predicted the number of service members expected to report
PTSD symptoms, based on the parameters of the stock and flow diagram and the definition of
fractional onset rate (Figure 4-4). Unit support has a substantial effect on the predicted number
of service members expected to experience PTSD symptoms but would hit a maximum effect at
a unit support of 4.6, when Fractional Onset Rate would be equal to zero. However, because this
relationship was defined linearly based on the literature, it would be possible for the calculated
fractional onset rate to have a negative value past a unit support score of 4.6. For this model's
purpose and analysis, the desired Fractional Onset Rate is zero to illustrate the ideal, desired state
for the enterprise.
However, the presence and effects of unit leadership and support would be most effective in-
theater, as unit leadership and support levels are initially high during deployment and later fall [76].
Previously deployed National Guard and Reserve Corps service members also reported feeling that
unit support was highest during their first deployment cycle [81]. Interestingly, as perception of unit
leadership and morale begin to fall around months 8-10 of a typical deployment cycle, the percent
of service members reporting feeling they "would be better off dead" or feeling that they might
hurt themselves in some way begins to increase [76]. Although the relationship between these two
observations may not be directly causal, it suggests that unit leadership and support for building ser-
vice member resilience in mitigating service member stress to affect downstream health outcomes
is likely critical mid- to late-deployment cycle, providing motivation for providing additional unit
resources for resilience building in-theater.
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Figure 4-4: Predicted effect of enhanced unit support.
4.3.2 Intended Prevention Effect: Service-specific Resilience Resources
As discussed in Section 2.2, service-specific resilience resources act in an analogous fashion to the
unit-level resources for training and preparedness in the Bacharach, et al. (2008) model, serving
to attenuate stress experienced and further balancing the individual-level dynamics discussed in
Section 4.2. Individual-level dynamics also serve to inform the availability of unit-level resources in
the model. The stock of Diagnosed Service Members informs the efficacy and future availability of
these service-specific resources because recommendations for resilience resource allocation is made
largely on this measure and how it changes yearly. For example, the effect of the pre-deployment
Battlemind training was measured by the number of service members who screened positive for
mental health problems-as discussed in Section 2.4.2, attendance at pre-deployment Battlemind
training decreased the number of service members eventually screening positive for mental health
problems by almost 8 percent (12 percent vs. the 20.5 percent who screened positive not having
attended pre-deployment Battlemind training). This result provided inertia for a recommendation to
emphasize Battlemind training for all service members throughout the deployment cycle. However,
it was noted that some units implemented pre-deployment Battlemind training in combination with
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Figure 4-5: Predicted effect of pre-deployment Battlemind resilience training.
other psychological health interventions, confounding the effect that pre-deployment Battlemind
training alone has on overall psychological health outcomes [76].
Based on the MHAT V (2008) findings and recommendation, a causal relationship between
variables Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources and Fractional Onset Rate was added to the
overall stock and flow diagram (see Appendix E). Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources was
defined to be the percentage of service members who reported attending pre-deployment Battlemind
training as was defined by the MHAT V (2008) study. Taken into account was the effect size seen
in the MHAT V (2008) study resulting from the potential combination of different types of pre-
deployment trainings as noted. Fractional Onset Rate was subsequently defined as:
Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources x 0.12
+(1 - Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources) x 0.205
Figure 4-5 illustrates the predicted effect of implementing required pre-deployment resilience
training. Based on the architecture of the stock and flow diagram, increasing the participation
rate of service members in pre-deployment resilience training would decrease the overall number of
predicted service members who would otherwise report PTSD symptoms. Because the participation
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-- -Current Pre-Deployment Battlemind Participation
(63%)
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S 80% Pre-Deployment Training Participation
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-0% Pre-Deployment Training Participation
rates varied linearly and the causal relationship between Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources
and Fractional Onset Rate was also defined linearly, the overall effect of increasing the participation
rate was a linear incremental shift downwards along the y-axis.
The condition "No Resilience Training" illustrates the simulation run with a constant onset rate
of 26 percent, the lower bound of the range of onset rates (26-30 percent) as specified by RAND
(2008). Condition "0% Pre-Deployment Training Participation" is based on the definition of "Frac-
tional Onset Rate" with the presence of pre-deployment resilience resources. Theoretically, these
two conditions should be similar because the initial model assumed that resilience programs had no
effect on the fractional onset rate. The separation of the two conditions over time indicates a poten-
tial inherent bias in the model introduced by the presence of the variable representing participation
in pre-deployment resilience resources or other dynamics that have not yet been identified. Addi-
tionally, it may represent potential differences between the RAND (2008) report and the MHAT
V (2008) report in defining onset rates of PTSD among the service member population, and these
differences should be explored in future work.
This sensitivity analysis illustrates the potential danger of policymaking based on short-term
measures like the yearly number of service members reporting PTSD symptoms. While these short-
term, yearly measures are useful for guiding funding policies and decisions, they do not account for
long-term negative effects, combined resilience trainings, or the compounding effects of multiple
deployments and combat exposures. As illustrated in Figure 4-5, the overall effect of implementing
pre-deployment resilience training does not occur until approximately 10 years after implementa-
tion. Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began in 2001 and the pathology of PTSD as a
signature wound of these wars is beginning to become salient approximately ten years later, demon-
strating the applicability of this model to future policymaking.
The model itself also illustrates observations made during qualitative interviews on the absence
of adequate utilization measures for resilience resources in determining resilience resource efficacy.
Figure 4-6 shows a portion of the dynamics which illustrates that there is no direct feedback to
the government as to the effectiveness of these resilience resources. This can be thought of as the
government's return on investment (ROI) for resilience resources, which is currently nonexistent.
Furthermore, according to interviews conducted, there are no clear measures of resilience resource
utilization or usefulness, leading to a plethora of resilience programs currently in place: "...instead of
figuring out which programs work and which don't, new programs are created." Insights provided by
interviewers indicated a level of frustration with resource allocation within the military in deploying
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Figure 4-6: Intended effect of resilience programs on individual-level dynamics.
external resilience resources. These dynamics are not unique to service-specific resources, and are
also affected by factors which affect the enterprise at large. The next section will now discuss
the dynamics that operate at an enterprise-level to affect the unit and the individual, and will also
examine how unit-level and individual-level dynamics also effect changes at the enterprise-level.
4.4 Enterprise-level Dynamics
4.4.1 Preventative Screening
In assessing the military's approach to mitigating the cumulative effects of operational demand dic-
tated by OIF/OEF resulting in returning service members displaying symptoms of PTSD, a logical
process to analyze is the military's assessment of potential candidates for military service. With the
knowledge available regarding pre-traumatic risk factors for PTSD, an understanding of how the
Figure 4-7: Preventative screening dynamics.
military currently assesses potential candidates for these risk factors provides insight on determin-
ing whether the military could have anticipated these outcomes and how decision-making would
have been affected in this context.
Figure 4-7 shows the current state dynamics of military preventative screening. An increase
in PTSD awareness should result in an increase of government pressure and action through policy
instructions, memos and directives. This increase in government funding can be funneled towards
research and innovations in screening mechanisms; the more useful these innovations, the more
likely they will be used, -and screening stringency should increase as a result. However, this should
increase the number of service members rejected due to health reasons, decreasing the number of
applicants that eventually enter the service and eventually decreasing the number of service mem-
bers that require treatment for PTSD. This represents an inherent trade-off between the number of
diagnosed service members and the number of accepted service members-the higher the number of
diagnosed service members, the lower number of applicants will be accepted into the service based
on increased screening stringency.
The costs of an all-volunteer force, the economic consequences of failing to meet recruiting tar-
gets and the estimates of economic loss that psychological health has had on the military have been
discussed at length in prior literature (i.e. [94, 96]). It might therefore be expected that increasing
screening stringency for preventative purposes might have a larger effect on reducing the onset rate
versus increasing participation in pre-deployment resilience training. Intuitively, increasing pre-
ventative screening would minimize the likelihood that an at-risk service member would require
psychological health services downstream. Interestingly, adjusting the percentage of service mem-
bers rejected due to health related reasons would not have a large effect on the number of service
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Figure 4-8: Predicted health screening dynamics.
members predicted to experience PTSD symptoms; after 10 years, raising the health related rejec-
tion rate from the current 10.8 percent to 80 percent would result in a decrease of about 100,000
additionally rejected service members (Figure 4-8).
This finding implies that a policy to increase screening standards as a method to decrease the
number of service members eventually experiencing mental health problems over would not be as
effective as other strategies, such as mandating pre-deployment resilience training as was explored
in Section 4.3.2. However, one possible caveat has been discussed earlier in this section-increasing
screening stringency implicitly leads to a decrease in the stock of available service members that
may experience symptoms of PTSD in the future, which may explain the slight decrease in PTSD
occurrence. The extent to which screening stringency might otherwise lead to increased service
member performance and decreased future onset rates has not been previously explored and would
provide more guidance for future policymaking in this area.
4.4.2 Intended Prevention Effect: DHP-Funded Resilience Resources
As with unit-level resilience resources, the effectiveness of DoD-wide resilience resources is not
seen or measured until the stock of service members diagnosed decreases or becomes zero. This is
because resilience resources serve to attenuate the stress experienced by boosting service member
resilience, resulting in a downstream decrease of symptom onset rate and decreased diagnoses.
Additionally, there are more system delays seen as it takes time for awareness of these resilience
resources to develop to provide the impetus for utilization of these resources. Because of these
delays, it becomes difficult for the government to determine how effective these resilience resources
are.
The first example of a time delay in this balancing loop is the effect that the onset and diagnosis
of symptoms among the service member population (Onset and Diagnosis) has on building aware-
ness of PTSD (PTSD Awareness) as a significant pathology of OIF/OEF. The number of diagnosed
service members follows S-shaped growth over time (Figure 4-9). S-shaped growth is a commonly
observed mode of behavior that results from initial exponential growth that gradually slows until the
state of the system reaches an equilibrium level. The dynamics that result in S-shaped growth are
illustrated in Figure 4-10. In this model, the S-shaped behavior of the number of diagnoses results
from the the reinforcing loop structure of diagnosed service members re-entering the system due
to deploying again with or without treatment, eventually balanced by the carrying capacity of the
stock of service members awaiting diagnosis. As a result, awareness of PTSD as a pathology of
OIF/OEF will build over time as the number of diagnoses increases, but the effect will be muted un-
til the number of diagnoses enters the accelerated growth phase. The number of diagnoses follows
S-shaped growth because of how system dynamics operates with stocks and flows. As described in
Section 3.2.2, stock and flow diagrams illustrate accumulations of a variable. Because the number
of diagnosed service members is defined as a stock variable in the model, eventually the stock will
reach its maximum capacity. Because the flow Treatment Rate is constant, once the stock Diagnosed
Service Members reaches capacity, it will increase at a constant rate and decrease at a constant rate
from that point forward. Awareness of resilience resources must build for resource utilization to
occur. Once resource utilization occurs, the effectiveness of these resources in building service
member resilience would not be seen unless there is a subsequent decrease in symptom onset rate
and diagnoses (i.e. Section 4.3.2).
The second example of time delays in this balancing loop is the relationship between the pres-
sure put on the government by the public to enact action for providing quality services for returning
service members (Government Pressure) and the subsequent legislation enacted to provide fund-
ing for these external resources (DHP Funding and Resilience Resources Awareness). A portion
of these delays results indirectly from the first time delay between Onset and Diagnosis and PTSD
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Figure 4-9: S-shaped growth of diagnoses.
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Awareness. As has already been shown, it takes time for the population of diagnosed service mem-
bers to grow to the extent that awareness of PTSD enters the public agenda and builds pressure for
government leaders to enact legislation that provides the funds to support resilience resources. An
example of this time delay is the publication of the 2007 Washington Post report regarding cases
of neglect at Walter Reed Army Medical Center [83], which will be discussed in greater depth in
Section 4.4.4. Furthermore, combat operations in Iraq began in 2001 and this report was published
in 2007; this six year difference could be considered a six year time delay for PTSD awareness to
reach a threshold level to warrant action for changing behavior in the system.
Additional time delays between these variables occurs as a result of the political process. An
overview of DoD issuances, policies put forth by DoD leadership, can be found in Appendix F and
are listed by need and time sensitivity from the least time sensitive (Directive) to the most time
sensitive (Directive-Type Memo). Directive-type memos are used to address the most time sensitive
actions and are valid for no more than 180 days, after which it must be incorporated into an existing
issuance, converted into a new issuance, renewed or canceled [28]. Instructions are revised every
five years, and directives are revised two to three years after their issuance.
It is clear that the length of time the political process requires, as well as the length of time
required for PTSD awareness to reach a threshold for political action plays a role in perpetuating
the behavior that govern these enterprise-wide dynamics. However, it is difficult to discern to what
extent the system delays are affecting the system dynamics due to the general lack of data available
to quantify relationships between verified qualitative variables like PTSD Awareness and Perceived
Stigma.
4.4.3 Operational Demand
As discussed previously in Section 2.3.1, the combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are unlike
any conflict the United States has previously fought; the cumulative effect of deployments, increased
frequency of deployment cycles and conflict length have all contributed to the increased prevalence
of PTSD seen by the military in recent years [94]. Figure 4-1 1 shows that an increase in operational
demand would lead to an increase in the number of service members required to meet that demand.
Coupled with the fact that all three components of the Army have had to meet operational demand
amidst being unable to meet recruiting targets, observers noted that the armed forces would not have
had enough troops available to accomplish their missions [96], demonstrated by the variable Service
Member Shortfall.
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Figure 4-11: Operational demand dynamics.
A sensitivity analysis to determine the salience of deployment rates on the system over time
indicates that over time, a higher deployment rate leads to a higher number of deployed service
members in the short-term, but that a lower deployment rate over time would lead to a higher cu-
mulative number of service members over time (Figure 4-12). With a lower deployment rate, over
time the stock of Service Members Deployed would take more time to reach its carrying capacity as
a stock. Outflows remain constant, so a higher fraction of those service members flowing through
the lifecycle would return to deployment, increasing the likelihood that they would experience an
onset of PTSD symptoms. In the short-term, with higher deployment rates the enterprise would
see an increased number of service members reporting PTSD symptoms because a larger number
of service members flow through the lifecycle earlier (Figure 4-13). However, a higher deployment
rate enables the lifecycle to be saturated faster as a higher number of service members are pushed
through the system, ensuring resources are utilized faster over time. As a result, a higher deploy-
ment rate over time would lead to an overall decrease in the predicted number of service members
expected to experience an onset of PTSD symptoms in the long-term.
These enterprise-level dynamics are influenced by individual-level dynamics. For example,
higher deployment rates at the onset would increase overall the number of service members report-
ing an onset of PTSD symptoms in the short-term. Because leadership uses the number of service
members reporting PTSD symptoms as a metric for policy and decision-making, an increase in
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Figure 4-12: Predicted number of deployed service members over time.
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the number of service members experiencing PTSD symptoms would influence policymakers to
increase the deployment rate in order to meet operational demand due to the decrease of available
healthy service members. These dynamics are also reflected if the initial number of service members
deployed were increased. In 2009, the number of service members deployed totaled 186,300 [15].
Figure 4-14 illustrates how increases in the initial number of deployed service members might ini-
tially yield a higher number of service members reporting PTSD symptoms. However, over time the
numbers of service members experiencing PTSD symptoms eventually hit a threshold of about 1.8
million over a range of 50 years. Figure 4-14 also shows how every two-fold increase in initial ser-
vice members deployed predicts an additional increase of approximately 100,000 service members
expected to experience PTSD symptoms during the first five years of combat operations. However,
after 10 years the predicted differences in the number of service members expected to develop PTSD
symptoms would become negligible. This suggests that a different strategy is required to address the
short-term increase in the number of service members who would require mental health services,
while long-term planning might rely on a different strategy based on the threshold predicted by the
model. Furthermore, this illustrates the importance of utilizing a different performance metric for
long-term mental health care delivery planning. The usage of the number of service members re-
porting PTSD symptoms as a basis for strategic decision-making and resource allocation would be
useful in the short-term, but a separate performance metric to inform long-term resource allocation
should be flexible enough to accommodate deviations from the predicted scenarios.
Further support for long-term resource allocation planning can be found in prior literature which
indicates that the consequences of undiagnosed psychological health issues such as PTSD range
from marital issues and domestic violence, increased vulnerability to homelessness and substance
abuse (i.e. [94, 86, 53]). Although combat operations are unlikely to be prolonged continuously
for 50 years, the rate of diagnoses could still occur after combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
conclude. Combat operations have been extended for upwards of 10 years since 2001, and general
public awareness was raised with the Washington Post report in 2007 six years later. With the
knowledge that undiagnosed psychological health issues might result in suicides, domestic violence
and other societal issues, it is reasonable to expect that psychological health diagnoses and their
societal consequences resulting from combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may continue for
a prolonged period of time.
The influence of a prior history of mental health issues would additionally perpetuate itself by
indirectly increasing operational demand via an overall increase in service member stress experi-
enced and a decrease in overall service member resilience. Unit-level resilience programs have
been shown in Section 4.3.2 to have an overall decrease in the overall number of service members
predicted to report an onset of PTSD symptoms over time. As a result, these dynamics comprise
a reinforcing loop demonstrating the potential effect of individual-level factors perpetuating them-
selves in enterprise-wide dynamics.
These results may seem counterintuitive as prior literature has indicated the salience of the
cumulative effect of deployments and increased frequency of deployment cycles on future health
outcomes (i.e. [94, 15]). However, although the model does mimic the deployment cycle by re-
turning flows of service members into theater (i.e. Returned Service Members become Deployed
Service Members, etc.), it does not track individual service members and the number of deploy-
ments each service member may have had, nor does it track the length of time an individual service
member might spend in theater. The model's parameters are such that the individual-level dynam-
ics are considered at a population level and also thereby considering all service members and their
characteristics in aggregate, resulting in that resolution loss. As a result, the model does not yet
have the capability to determine how multiple deployments may affect future health outcomes at the
individual-level. However, the model does have the capability to determine how a constant deploy-
ment rate of service members and changes in initial service member deployment over time would
affect future health outcomes overall.
4.4.4 Post-Trauma Diagnosis and Treatment
The routes of diagnosis and treatment were previously discussed in Chapter 2. Agenda-setting
theory stipulates that the news media has a large influence on audiences by their choice of what
stories to consider newsworthy and how much prominence and space to give them [62]. McCombs
and Shaw saw nearly perfect correspondence between ranking of major issues on the press and
public agendas; the public learns about the issues of the press agenda with relatively little effort and
movement of issues from press to public agenda is relatively salient [62].
The media coverage of the nation's response to its obligation to furnish health care for OIF/OEF
service members further exemplifies McCombs and Shaw's observations regarding the movement
of issues from the press to the public agenda. The public consciousness of the importance of the
U.S. military and veterans health care systems in providing care to its veterans was heightened to a
level not seen since the end of the Vietnam War [51]. For example, in 2007, the Washington Post
published a series of articles outlining cases of neglect at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, result-
ing in an extensive analysis of the Veterans Affairs health care system, as well as the resignation and
termination of multiple military leaders associated with Walter Reed [83]. Similarly, we can expect
that increased media coverage of PTSD builds public awareness, propelling the government to in-
vest funding in proper screening and treatment resources for returning service members, increasing
the number of diagnosed service members and resulting in reinforcing behavior loops (Figure 4-15).
Increased funding to determine the efficacy of current screening and treatment resources and to
improve technologies that would improve psychological health treatment would also decrease the
associated costs with screening and treatment. For example, telemental health care is currently being
investigated as an alternate treatment method for service members requiring treatment. A compara-
tive cost-analysis study by Grady (2002) found that telemental health care was the least expensive
form of psychological health treatment when compared to in-person treatment options among Navy
service members [37]. Integrating technologies such as telemental health care to decrease treatment
costs would help to increase the treatment rate, as less service members would require in-person
treatment resources, which can then be diverted to areas of need (i.e. in theater) and also increase
the number of service members seeking treatment who would have otherwise gone untreated.
Sensitivity analyses performed demonstrate the salience of providing available psychological
health care in theater. Figures 4-16 and 4-17 contrast the effect of providing psychological health
care to service members in theater. Without in theater care, the likelihood of PTSD and other
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Figure 4-15: Post-trauma diagnosis and treatment dynamics in garrison.
psychological health issues remaining a significant pathology of OEF/OIF is clear-the higher the
sustained deployments, the more likely it is that the gap between diagnosed and treated service
members will persist (Figure 4-16). However, as seen in Figure 4-17, the treatment gap eventually
closes, even at a deployment rate of 20 percent.
Finally, the relationship between individual-level, unit-level and enterprise-level dynamics can
be seen in the sensitivity analysis performed to examine the influence resilience resources could
have on the population of service members requiring treatment. Figure 4-18 shows that requiring
service members to participate in pre-deployment resilience training could have a small impact on
closing the predicted treatment gap and support in theater care. In theater care still appears to
have the most impact on closing the predicted treatment gap in the face of increasing deployment
rates, but the sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate how resilience resources would support in
theater care shows that pre-deployment resilience participation also decreases the treatment gap.
This is because pre-deployment resilience resources decreases the onset rate, versus the impact that
in theater care has on decreasing the overall stock of service members who are eventually diagnosed
and treated in garrison.
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Figure 4-16: Predicted treatment gap without in theater care.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter concludes this thesis by introducing potential policy recommendations for considera-
tion and their implications, and presents ideas for future research work. Section 5.1 summarizes the
insights gained from the model and sensitivity analyses performed, providing support for the policy
recommendations proposed and discussed in Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 proposes areas for
future work to improve on this work at large and supports the architecting of a future state for the
defined enterprise.
5.1 Model Insights
Six main insights emerged from the system dynamics model:
1. Unit support had a substantial effect on the predicted number of service members ex-
pected to screen positive for PTSD symptoms over time; additionally, unit leadership
and support may have the most effect in theater during a deployment cycle. As seen
in Figure 4-3, a unit cohesion score of 4 would decrease the predicted number of service
members expected to experience an onset of PTSD symptoms by more than two-fold in 25
years from approximately 1 million with the current cohesion score of 2.427 to less than
500,000. Each increase of I in the unit cohesion score led to a decrease in the population of
service members expected to screen positive for PTSD symptoms over time, with the largest
increase seen between scores 3 and 4. Further work could also investigate the potential con-
nection between the observed drop in service member perception of unit cohesion mid- to
late-deployment cycle and the influence of increasing unit cohesion and leadership in theater.
2. Pre-deployment resilience programs decrease the number of service members predicted
to experience PTSD symptoms, although significant differences are only seen after a
long period of time. The policy options military leadership has to decrease the number
of service members predicted to experience PTSD while maintaining a force large enough to
meet operational demand include increasing the deployment rate and increasing the number of
health waivers granted as strategies to increase the overall number of service members. Other
options include mandating pre-deployment resilience training to improve the likelihood that a
service member would be able to cope with stress experienced. Based on sensitivity analyses,
the policy most likely to have the most impact on decreasing the overall number of service
members that would experience an onset of PTSD symptoms would be to increase service
member participation in pre-deployment resilience training as per the MHAT V (2008) study.
3. Increasing screening stringency and the percentage of service members rejected at ac-
cession due to health reasons alone would not have as large of an effect on the predicted
number of service members expected to screen positive for PTSD symptoms over time
as pre-deployment resilience training or increased unit support. Figure 4-8 showed the
results of the sensitivity analysis performed to test the potential implementation of increased
stringency in health screenings during accession. The sensitivity analysis indicated that in-
creasing screening stringency would likely not have as large of an effect as pre-deployment
resilience training or unit cohesion on future psychological health outcomes-the slight differ-
ences in health outcomes would only be seen almost 50 years later. This is partially due to
the overall decreased initial service member population from increased screening standards
available to flow through the system. Other mechanisms by which increased screening might
result in improved future psychological health outcomes is otherwise unclear due to a general
lack of data regarding information known at accession and subsequent health outcomes.
4. Increasing the deployment rate results in an overall decrease in the carrying capacity
of service members expected to screen positive for PTSD over time, whereas increasing
the initial number of service members deployed does not have a large effect on future
aggregate health outcomes. Initially increasing the number of service members deployed
would have an effect much earlier in the system by pushing through a higher number of
service members in the first few years of the sensitivity analysis, as illustrated in Figure 4-
14. However, this initial spike in service members would be mitigated downstream as service
member stocks accumulate more slowly over time. Increasing the deployment rate results
in an overall decrease in the carrying capacity of service members expected to experience
an onset of symptoms over time because stocks would accumulate faster, ensuring that the
system reaches its carrying capacity sooner. Once the stock of Diagnosed Service Members
reaches its carrying capacity, no more service members can flow into that stock, so they are
pushed into the other outflow (i.e. treatment in theater), and the system continues to use the
"Diagnosis Rate" flow to deplete the "Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD" stock at
a constant rate. A higher deployment rate increases the likelihood that service members will
be forced to seek treatment in theater during deployment as the system's carrying capacity is
filled at an earlier point in time, ultimately decreasing the overall number of service members
who would otherwise need treatment in garrison.
5. The effect of the general lack of performance and utilization measurements for exter-
nal resilience resources, when combined with systemic time delays, is manifested in
individual-level dynamics. In general, there is a lack of knowledge regarding the efficacy
of external resilience resources, and resources instead are diverted into creating new pro-
grams. A lack of utilization data increases the difficulty to which resilience resources may
be leveraged for training service members, as it leads to the assumption that these resilience
resources either do not exist or do not work, and further results in extraneous programs, a
source of enterprise waste.
Although the MHAT V (2008) study did provide one example of utilization and performance
measurements for the Army's pre-deployment Battlemind training, the mechanisms by which
the pre-deployment training serve to improve eventual mental health outcomes in the service
member population remains unclear. Furthermore, there has been little follow-up to deter-
mine the long-term outcomes and efficacy of the MHAT V (2008) study on pre-deployment
Battlemind training. The model utilizes current literature to indicate relationships between
service member stress experienced, service member resilience and post traumatic growth to
mitigate PTSD onset rate. However, there is no literature to date that has mathematically
modeled these relationships because there is little empirical data to suggest how these vari-
ables are related beyond an assumed linear relationship. These mathematical equations based
in empirical data will be critical for expanding this system dynamic model's capability to
predict this system's outcomes.
As seen throughout the model, time delays in building awareness of PTSD, providing govern-
ment funding and building usable and reliable pre-traumatic and post-traumatic innovations
introduces complexity in decision-making throughout the enterprise. For example, it takes
time for awareness of PTSD within a group of service members to emerge in order to propel
the government to initiate legislation to allow for funding for resilience resources. Secondly,
as mentioned, the actual utilization of resilience programs is unknown, adding another di-
mension of complexity for decision-making in the enterprise regarding resilience resources.
In the mean time, the reinforcing loop of risk factor influence masks any immediate balanc-
ing effects from resilience resources, rendering it difficult to determine how best to allocate
resources by key decision-makers ingrained in the system. Because of the operational de-
mand dictated by OIF/OEF, decision-making needed to occur in the face of these time delays,
which are less than ideal circumstances in which to be making large-scale organizational and
strategic decisions.
6. Enterprise-level decision-making based on a lack of outcomes data leads to a gap in
fulfilling individual-level needs. Qualitative data from interviews conducted with members
of the Military Health System indicate that this stress-resilience relationship may not be as
simple as a negatively correlated relationship between stress and resilience. The military's
current view of resilience is that the more service member stress experienced, the more a
service member's resilience decreases without prior resilience training [13]. In reality, this
resilience ability decreases initially but builds over time with post traumatic growth as the
service member learns to cope and deal with his or her stress [20, 60, 4]. The relationship
between stress and resilience additionally varies on an individual basis, adding system com-
plexity in assessing potential cause-effect relationships in the enterprise.
5.2 Potential Policy Recommendations and Their Implications
Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are now in their tenth year, which had not been predicted.
The military was also facing potential shortfalls in meeting recruitment targets while relying on an
all-volunteer force [961. This section discusses the potential policies the military could implement
in order to prepare a medically ready force and the underlying issues and implications that should
be considered in this policy discussion.
5.2.1 Increased Screening Stringency Implications and the Fitting of Potential At-
Risk Service Members to Resilience Training
Literature indicates that there is a documented history of military screening policies [24, 84, 21].
During World War II, psychiatric screening was considered essential to the military effort with the
goal of rejecting all service members with a greater than average likelihood of having difficulty
adjusting to military service life [21]. After World War II, psychiatric screenings were integrated
into the general medical examination at accession, as the accession standards had been considered
excessive and thought to result in an unnecessary loss of potential service members [84]. Screening
processes were unable to evaluate the most important factors influencing the adjustment of a soldier,
including the leadership he would receive, his degree of motivation, the type of position and unit
assigned, and the degree of external stress to which he would be exposed, and it was advocated that
greater proficiency of evaluating service suitability would be better accomplished by evaluating re-
cruits under military conditions, rather than by using extensive induction screening procedures [21].
However, others have urged a review of current screening effectiveness, as a significant number
of recruits are discharged in their first 6 months because they fail to meet minimum performance
criteria or because of disqualifying medical criteria [24]. In the context of budget restraints and
the continuation of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the recruitment and retention of
high-quality enlistees is extremely important for the U.S. military; the General Accounting Office
concluded that an improvement in screening mechanisms could result in substantial financial sav-
ings to the Department of Defense [24]. However, based on our current findings, we recommend that
military leadership additionally explore the potential fitting of at-risk service members to resilience
resources and training.
The military should also consider policy options in light of service member shortfalls due to the
extension of combat operations in theater. As discussed, the military has a few options to ensure
a substantially numbered force. First, it can accept more overall service members by increasing
recruitment and lowering standards. This sensitivity analysis was performed and discussed in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. However, lowering standards implied a higher rate of service members who could present
with PTSD symptoms over time, especially if they displayed risk factors that were highly correlated
with the onset of PTSD symptoms. In contrast, by raising screening standards, the military risks not
having enough manpower to meet operational demands in theater. The possibility of being too con-
servative with screening based on the potential that service members will develop PTSD resulting
from combat exposure could lead to a depletion of the all-volunteer force, especially considering
that the services ability to maintain their force levels in combat operations depends partly on their
success in attracting volunteers.
A policy barring those recruits determined most at-risk for developing PTSD could theoretically
be applied with the justification being that they would not be medically ready to serve. However,
a ban on service members displaying risk factors for PTSD calls to mind a similar issue which
the military is currently facing-the ban on homosexuals serving in the military and the Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" policy6 , currently under repeal. Pending certification of the policy's repeal, military
discharges were still occurring under "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" until July 6, 2011, when the 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the federal government must cease enforcement of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" [82].
There are established medical thresholds that potential service members must clear in order to
enlist and begin basic military training. The difference with these medical enlistment requirements
and "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is that the medical enlistment requirements as set by the Department of
Defense are in place to ensure that service members are physically fit to perform their military duties
as opposed to ensuring a cohesive unit and maintaining military culture: "The prohibition against
homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in
the unique circumstances of military service" [I]. Homosexuality or exposure to a past traumatic
event in the past is something that is extremely difficult, if not impossible to change and may not
always lead to a service member's inability to fulfill his or her military duties. Banning citizens
from military service because of something they cannot change (in this case, their predisposition to
PTSD based on previous exposure and risk factors) may prove extremely controversial, as is seen
with "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." It could be possible grounds for discrimination suits and potentially
costly to the military, which is facing an already strained all-volunteer force. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) estimated that the costs to the military resulting from enforcement of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" totaled approximately $95 million over 10 years to cover the recruitment
and replacement of service members dismissed [77].
Enforcing a ban on service members displaying risk factors for PTSD would also likely increase
the stigma associated with PTSD and other psychological health disorders and likely increase the
number of Type II (false negative) errors occurring during the health assessment process at acces-
sion. Increasing the stigma associated with PTSD and other psychological health disorders would
likely cause potential applicants to the service to lie about previous history with psychological health
disorders, as well as lying about any issues at home or other social settings, because of an increased
fear that applicants will automatically be disqualified and negatively viewed. An example from the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" history indicates that encouraging these recruits to apply and to not be
ashamed of their prior medical history would likely help to eliminate any potential stigma resulting
from negative views of psychological health issues. The DoD published a comprehensive report
on the potential effects of repealing "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", and the results indicated a positive
response-approximately 70 percent of military personnel thought that integrating gays into the mil-
itary would be positive, mixed or of no consequence [101]. Qualitative interview data also suggests
that a similar policy for PTSD risk factors and prior history of psychological health issues would
have negative consequences on the military force: "You want balance and diversity in the force."
The military can also increase deployment rates to ensure it has enough service members in
theater to meet operational demands. This sensitivity analysis was performed in Section 4.4.3 and
illustrated that although deployment rates do play a substantial role in contributing to the number of
service members predicted to experience PTSD symptoms in the short-term, in the long-term high
deployment rates lead to an overall lowered number of predicted service members experiencing
PTSD symptoms. Most importantly, the overall effect of deployment rates in lowering the number
of service members predicted to experience PTSD symptoms was not as salient as the effect of
implementing pre-deployment resilience training. However, this model did not account for the
effect of repeated deployments on external stakeholders such as families.
Since the military relies on an all-volunteer force, it must depend on the number of accepted
applicants who eventually access into the service. With this knowledge of potential risk factors for
PTSD and other psychological health issues, further consideration should be taken to ensure that the
maximum number of applicants are able to contribute to the force, even if it may not be in combat
operations. Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) could be revisited and redefined to ensure that
applicants predisposed to developing psychological issues resulting from traumatic experiences can
contribute in other ways.
A policy option that has not been explored in-depth is fitting service members who display risk
factors for PTSD to resilience training, and a possible mandate that these service members undergo
additional resilience training. Existing barriers to mental health care within the military health sys-
tem make it extremely difficult for service members to receive care for their symptoms, in addition
6 
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the common term for the policy enacted by the federal government to prohibit openly gay
and lesbian citizens from serving in the armed forces, while preventing the military from attempting to reveal or discover
any active service members who might be gay or lesbian (10 U.S.C. 5 654).
to the negative stigma faced by the service members while serving. Additionally, the availability
of mental health services is variable; some programs or MTFs may not have enough resources to
treat all who wish to be treated, or psychologists embedded in-theatre are not trained enough to treat
all in-theatre service members, even if there are enough psychologists available [94]. Comman-
ders are likely to be uncomfortable with allowing service members to leave their posts for mental
health treatment, as their manpower decreases with every soldier who asks for mental health treat-
ment. Finally, the consequence of requiring mandatory mental health treatment for those displaying
a predisposition to developing PTSD may manifest itself later, after the soldier has completed the
treatment and is cleared for deployment. As mentioned previously, military screening for risk fac-
tors predisposing someone to PTSD could lead to a negative flag on a recruits record, subsequently
resulting in consequences such as adverse effects on self-esteem and a negative psychiatric label.
These consequences could result in further unintended alterations of behavior within the unit, as
unit members may be likely to further protect their labeled comrade from more extreme combat sit-
uations. The unit also risks alienating the service member in question if the service member never
develops PTSD and feels as though his unit is overprotecting him or her, creating a destructive cycle
of negative self-esteem by the individual in question.
However, additional training for at-risk service members could targeted by unit and not to an
individual. For example, at-risk service members could be grouped together into a unit for additional
resilience training, in addition to the basic and advanced training they would have received with their
cohort for their assigned posts. Alternatively, at-risk service members could be pulled from different
units and grouped together for resilience training, ensuring a different type of unit support-the
support at-risk service members would have with each other, regardless of affiliated service. Fitting
additional resilience training to specific units or by grouping at-risk service members together to
receive training together would help to reduce any potential stigma an individual service member
would face from his or her unit should he or she be flagged at-risk, ensuring the entire unit and
possibly the entire military force becomes more resilient together.
Furthermore, resilience training as an upstream, preventative measure would assist in alleviating
some of the resource allocation issues faced by the enterprise. Previously mentioned were the vari-
able availability of mental health services, in addition to the occasional lack of services altogether
in some MTFs or in theater. Resilience training would reduce the strain placed on psychological
health and medical personnel as it would decrease the number of service members predicted to re-
quire treatment as a direct result of the decrease in the number of service members experiencing an
onset of PTSD symptoms.
5.2.2 Strategic Short-term Operational Decision-making and Concurrent Long-Term
Operational Policymaking
Research has largely been devoted to investigating the relationships between one or two of these
levels and their respective factors influencing both the organization and the individual (i.e. [12, 22]).
While this research expands this to include a tertiary level of enterprise dynamics, the military must
deal with a fairly unique external environment when considering policy implementation for service
member health care delivery. Health care policy implementation must consider external enterprise-
wide factors such as military operational strategy, media attention, political climate and war hazards;
unit-level factors like resilience resources and job performance; and individual-level factors such as
individual risk factors when deciding which policies to change or enact to ensure high enterprise
performance.
Based on qualitative interview data and additionally validated by the system dynamics model of
the enterprise, we have seen that the primary mode of decision-making in the military mental health
care enterprise is reactive decision-making. An example of reactive decision-making occurred in
the enterprise-level dynamics of operational demand discussed in Section 4.4.3. Leadership uses
the number of service members reporting an onset of PTSD symptoms as a performance metric for
mental health care delivery and would likely enact a policy to reduce the number of service mem-
bers presenting with PTSD symptoms via methods like accession screening, increasing the number
of mental health care providers, or increasing the number of resilience resources available to service
members. However, as described in Section 4.4.4, past literature suggests that when media cov-
erage and public awareness focus on post-deployment dynamics, attention is diverted away from
developing prevention and resilience efforts that may have a larger impact [62]. By focusing on
post-deployment dynamics, decision-making tends to focus on what the military can do "right now"
to assist service members as dictated by service member needs and desires for proper diagnosis and
treatment. There is an inherent trade-off in increasing the number of diagnosed service members, as
an increase in diagnosed service members ultimately results in an increase in service member short-
fall as these diagnosed service members are thereby unable to serve in combat temporarily. This
then perpetuates the operational demand dynamics previously discussed, contributing to the per-
sonnel issues seen by the military during OEF/OIF. This focus on post-deployment dynamics may
prove detrimental in the long-term as the military considers how best to learn from these operational
inefficiencies to strategize a long-term solution for prevention and resilience.
Additional complexity results from inherent system delays, such as the required time for the
number of diagnoses to reach the exponential growth phase and arises from decision-making with-
out the use of adequate performance and utilization metrics to accurately divert funding through
DHP or through discretionary funding to increase the number of high-performing resilience pro-
grams. Qualitative interview data also indicates that part of this complexity results from the use of
discretionary funding to create and fund resilience programs. Since this funding is dispersed at the
line's discretion, it is not specifically earmarked for resilience. As a result, it is difficult to track
line resilience resources as they are created, merged with other resources, or ended. Additionally,
this leads to a breakdown in communication and information flow regarding the performance and
utilization of these programs.
The policymaking process also partially contributes to reactive decision-making. For example,
directive-type memos are valid for 180 days and issued for time-sensitive actions with the likeli-
hood that they will become permanent DoD issuances, instructions or directives (see Appendix F).
It could be argued that the need for directive-type memos directly supports unforeseen circum-
stances involving the DoD and that there is a concurrent effort via DoD instructions and directives
to establish more long-term policymaking. However, the sensitivity analyses done in this thesis
work illustrate the danger of issuing reactive policies based on early data retrieval. For example, it
may appear early on that high deployment rates contribute to a higher onset rate, but the long-term
outlook indicates that the number of service members experiencing an onset of symptoms will be
lower in the long-term. Directive-type memos provide policymaking with some flexibility as they
are only effective for 180 days, enabling organizations to further review the effectiveness of the
policy, but relying on directive-type memos to change or implement policy as needed can lead to
an overwhelming number of memos. This increases complexity and also increases the likelihood of
increasing enterprise waste.
When considering these decision-making complexities in conjunction with the need for high
service member performance to meet operational demand, the difficulty of decision-making in the
military to adequately propose policies that can adequately adapt to fit individual-level needs as well
as enterprise-level demands becomes clear. Adequate resource performance and utilization metrics
should be crafted to track and measure the creation and termination of resilience resources over
time, as well as resource efficacy. Recommendations for resilience resources should then be data-
driven, using the data generated from these performance metrics. In addition, although operational
demand will call for short-term, strategic decision-making, these policies should be concurrently
crafted with a long-term strategy focusing on health outcomes predictions based on the short-term
policies implemented.
5.2.3 Linking Accession Data to Health Outcomes to Inform Future Policymaking
This thesis utilized data from AMSARA to populate the stock and flow diagram of the system
dynamics model. Based on this data, simulations were run to generate long-term potential scenar-
ios that could be used to support policy implementation as discussed in examining screening and
waiver granting processes. Using this logic, policies regarding mental health screening and waiver
granting should also be grounded in data that documents the eventual health outcomes of service
members who had been granted waivers for previous mental health conditions. However, qualitative
interviews and data from AMSARA indicate that this is currently not the case.
Table 5.1 summarizes the most frequent mental and behavioral health conditions for which
health waivers were applied for in 2010 [2]. The data indicates that over 50 percent of waivers
sought for these mental and behavioral health conditions were eventually granted, but that the total
number of successful waiver applicants who eventually access into the service is a small fraction of
the total service member population (approximately 2,000 versus the 186,300 initial service mem-
ber population number used for the model). Although the magnitude of service members eventually
accessing with a mental health waiver might be considered relatively low in comparison to other
health disqualifications (i.e. cannabis dependence or abuse), the connection between medical con-
ditions screened for at MEPS, eventual waiver application success and eventual health outcomes
still remains relatively unknown.
To date, only one study has explored the relationship between mental health status at accession
and eventual service member attrition. Research done at Lackland Air Force Base tentatively shows
a strong negative correlation between a service member's performance on a questionnaire designed
to describe a recruit's pre-service mental and behavioral health and attrition [32]. This study resulted
from the identification of an unmet need to classify service members based on their likelihood to
submit to attrition as a result of previous mental health history during the training period in the
Air Force. This study also provides support for screening improvements to reduce the number of
trainees with a history of behavioral problems from entering the service, as well as to better fit
service members to their occupations. Although the potential implications of increased screening
has already been discussed in Section 5.2.1, this study provides an example of how information at
Table 5.1: Top Most Frequent Mental and Behavior Health Conditions [2]
Mental & Behavioral
System
Applied
waiver Sought
Waived
Waived
Accessed % Accessed
Cannabis dependence or 7,050 35.3 4,241 60.2 1,162 27.4
abuse
Cocaine dependence or 988 40.7 597 60.4 75 12.6
abuse
ADD/ADHD 544 27.0 334 61.4 171 51.2
Suicidal behavior 199 22.3 122 61.3 35 28.7
Conduct/behavior disor- 187 27.1 102 54.5 32 31.4
der
Amphetamine depen- 178 27.6 103 57.9 10 9.7
dence or abuse
Personality disorders 124 22.2 75 60.5 12 16.0
Alcohol dependence or 119 22.4 71 59.7 22 31.0
abuse
Adjustment disorders 82 30.1 47 57.3 19 40.4
Unspecified or mixed
substance dependence or
abuse
79 35.7 53.2 16.7
an early stage of the military lifecycle (accession) can be used to inform policy implementation that
can have widespread systemic effects that can lead to increased prevention and overall behavioral
wellness among the military service member population. Most importantly, this example provides
additional support for long-term operational policymaking. It illustrates how enterprise and unit-
level decisions (i.e. Air Force leadership) can have substantial effects on the individual service
member (i.e. increasing the stringency to which a service member might access into the service),
effects that will be perpetuated into the long-term.
5.3 Future Work
Although the model and its results have informed potential policies military leadership should con-
sider in its future vision of psychological health care delivery, its limitations present areas for future
work that can improve and better inform decision-making in the long-term. A discussion of these
ideas, based on the model assumptions and thesis limitations previously discussed in Sections 1.4
and 3.4, follow below.
100
5.3.1 Consideration of Other Populations
The system dynamics model developed for this thesis research briefly considers the effect of Na-
tional Guard and Reserve service members to the extent that they undergo the same accession pro-
cesses as active duty service members but do not engage in the same basic training and resilience
training as active duty service members. Future research could analyze potential differences in re-
silience and preparedness levels between active duty and Reserve and National Guard service mem-
bers. In addition, there is a potential opportunity to leverage the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) as an
area where current resilience resources available for active duty service members can be extended
to Reserve and National Guard service members. The potential impact of this extension could be
studied for future policy planning.
5.3.2 Modeling Individual Effects on Population Health Outcomes
As a research method, system dynamics studies high-level effects and aggregates population dif-
ferences into a continuous function, allowing conclusions to be made about a population at large.
However, this implicitly means that any individual differences and data outliers are lost. An individ-
ual service member's experiences, such as the number of deployments served and any lengthened
deployments served, are important factors when considering an individual's likelihood to develop
PTSD symptoms, and this system dynamics model does not have the capability to determine how
an individual may directly affect overall population health outcomes. A dynamic model developed
by Atkinson, et al. (2009) modeled the relationship between deployment tempo, combat stress and
PTSD prevalence [I I]. The strength of the Atkinson, et al. (2009) model is its ability to account for
individual variation by accounting for variation in risk across different service member populations,
assigning different stress strengths to individual service members and allowing service members to
accumulate stress in a stochastic process. However, the conclusions that the Atkinson, et al. (2009)
model generates are still based on the aggregate service member population at large. Future work
could expand on the system dynamics model in this thesis and the concepts of the Atkinson, et
al. (2009) model by determining an individual service member's contribution to the dynamics in
both models. The knowledge gained from this exercise would enable more robust scenario plan-
ning and inform the future fitting of service members to resilience training and health assessment
policymaking.
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5.3.3 Variance of System Delay and Combat Operation Lengths, Rates and Time
Steps
The influence of delays was discussed as instrumental to the reinforcement of behavior in this sys-
tem (i.e., post-trauma screening and diagnosis dynamics). However, this work did not attempt to
quantify this influence. Future work should elucidate and quantify variables such as media influence,
awareness of PTSD and its effect on government funding initiatives for innovations in post-trauma
screening and diagnosis. The lengths of these delays should also be varied to determine the salience
of these delays on the system dynamics. Varying the lengths of combat operations and introduc-
ing pauses would better determine the long-term effects of undiagnosed psychological health issues,
which can be used to better inform future resource allocation for the larger societal and public health
contexts.
Section 3.4 describes the model's assumption that deployment rates are equal to return rates,
based on the assumption that for every service member that deploys, a service member returns.
However, this may not be realistic as the number of service members deployed are due to other
factors such as the demands of operations in theater as well as the number of service members
whose deployments have been lengthened due to operational demand. Varying the deployment rates
and return rates based on these factors would increase the resolution of the model in evaluating
the effects of multiple deployments and unexpected lengthened deployments and shortened rest
periods on eventual psychological health outcomes, as these factors have been shown to increase
the likelihood of the onset of PTSD symptoms [94].
Also mentioned in Section 3.4 is that the model's defined time step is one year because the
data utilized in this work was collected and reported by fiscal year, although other data sources did
increase the resolution of their data reported to month-long ranges (i.e., [15]). Decreasing the time
step to one month would improve the resolution of the model and expand on this work if more
detailed (monthly or quarterly) data sources can be identified for usage, as the model would then
be able to predict service member population changes monthly, rendering it a powerful tool for
deployment and resource planning.
5.3.4 Accounting for Post-Deployment Surges in Psychological Health Care Demand
As discussed in Section 3.4, the model assumed that as a service member deploys, another one
returns. This means that over time, the model eventually hits a threshold level of service members
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as stocks accumulate in the model. However, this assumption implicitly assumes that there is no
variation in the rates at which service members are deployed or return, which is likely not the
case in real life. As a result, future modeling could incorporate other methods to test alternate
scenarios. An example of a scenario that might be investigated in future work could be the scenario
in which more units return home than normal, leading to a larger than anticipated demand for
psychological health resources. This model currently informs policymaking on the assumption that
these predicted service member numbers will hit a threshold level, and alternate modeling methods
could better inform policymaking by incorporating dynamic changes in demand to better inform
resource planning.
5.3.5 Further Analysis and Investigation of Unit Cohesion Effect During Deploy-
ment
Section 4.3 discussed the effect of unit cohesion on decreasing the number of service members pre-
dicted to screen positive for PTSD symptoms. Furthermore, the MHAT V (2008) study found that
service members felt that unit cohesion decreased over the early to mid-stages of the deployment
cycle, with its lowest point during mid-deployment. However, there was no follow-up to these find-
ings. Future modeling work should also consider the effect of deployment time on unit leadership
and unit support. Future study could also focus on the relationship between deployment activities
and unit cohesion to inform unit leadership of how they can best support their service members
during mid-deployment in order to build collective unit resilience and increase the likelihood that
their service members will not develop symptoms of PTSD and other psychological health issues.
This model could be further strengthened by the usage of a table function to illustrate the effect
of unit cohesion on future service member health outcomes. Because many variable relationships
are nonlinear, system dynamics often uses table functions to illustrate the effect of these nonlinear
relationships, which are specified by a table of values for the independent and dependent variables
[90]. This model utilized a linear, analytic relationship to describe the relationship between unit
cohesion and health outcomes as the literature indicated a linear correlation between the two vari-
ables. However, the ability to change the shape, slope and saturation points of the function within
the model's parameters was lost as a result. With additional data, the incorporation of a table func-
tion to describe the relationship between unit cohesion and future health outcomes would give the
model more flexibility in performing additional, more robust sensitivity analyses, as well as testing
scenarios that may be more realistic. A table function would also be able to test additional quantita-
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tive data resulting from future study in this area, providing more information about the variance of
the relationship between these two variables.
5.3.6 Further Quantitative Analysis of External Resilience Resources
The comprehensive system dynamics model of the military mental health enterprise clearly demon-
strates the existence of potential feedback mechanisms that may not have been previously con-
sidered by policymakers in a time of war. Furthermore, the model illustrated the importance of
outlining a long-term strategy for the enterprise as leadership and policymakers work to alleviate
imminent concerns like operational demand, as feedback effects from these policies may linger
for years to come as seen in the military's work to combat PTSD and psychological health issues
resulting from OIF/OEF.
The stock and flow modeling of the military service member lifecycle illustrates the effect that
the waiver process and deployment rates have on the overall lifecycle and validates external ob-
servations seen by other studies (i.e. [44, 94]). Although literature has suggested that resilience
programs do have a positive effect on reducing onset and diagnosis rates, the mechanism by which
this occurs has not yet been quantified because of a lack of performance and utilization data. Fur-
thermore, it is unclear as to what the optimal number of resilience programs might be, as well as
the impact of potentially integrating similar programs across the services. Exploration of the extent
to which external resilience programs are successful in both the long-term mitigation of service
member stress and their impact on long-term service member preparedness could be considered. As
with the relationship between unit cohesion and future health outcomes, a table function could be
also implemented into the model to test quantitative data and its variance, as well as test additional
scenarios involving the function's slope and saturation points. Furthermore, the sensitivity analy-
sis performed to analyze the salience of pre-deployment resilience training participation on future
health outcomes indicated potential differences between data sets used in the RAND (2008) and
the MHAT V (2008) study, in addition to a potential inherent bias introduced by the variable added
to represent pre-deployment resilience training participation or other dynamics not yet studied or
represented. These dynamics and factors should also be highlighted for future study.
In addition, this research was limited in terms of the types of organizations and services repre-
sented. This thesis research primarily focused on the Army's resilience efforts as well as resilience
efforts that were not specific to a service branch. While other services were briefly considered inso-
far as to recognize that each service has different training requirements and methods for conducting
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accession processes and resilience training, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that there may
be undocumented and unofficial methods for conducting resilience training and ensuring a level of
social support for service members throughout the lifecycle. Further research could consider how
best to represent these external factors in the model for quantitative analysis.
5.3.7 Quantitative Analysis of Post-Trauma Diagnosis and Treatment Dynamics
As discussed in Section 1.4, this thesis did not attempt to study all psychological health processes
across the lifecycle and a focus was placed on accession and training processes. Sensitivity analyses
discussed in this thesis were performed based on the stock and flow diagram of the military service
lifecycle (Appendix C), the basis for the overall system dynamics model of the enterprise (Appendix
B). Although enterprise-level dynamics were elucidated based on the qualitative and quantitative
methods used, sensitivity analyses were conducted based on the stock and flow model of the military
service member lifecycle due to the general lack of quantitative data available regarding post-trauma
diagnosis and treatment dynamics and their causal relationships to external factors like screening
stringency and usefulness of psychological health innovations. Literature that the sensitivity analy-
ses were built on have shown that there is literature indicating correlations between various external
factors and health outcomes (i.e. [76, 17, 29]). However, the exact causal mechanisms by which
these correlations occur have not been quantified, and future work could identify and quantify these
relationships, increasing the resolution to which these dynamics are viewed.
5.3.8 Investigation into the Linkage of Accession Data and Future Health Outcomes
As discussed throughout this thesis, prior mental health history has been documented in recent
literature as a pre-traumatic risk factor for PTSD, and a significant number of active duty service
member suicides were found to be the result of at least one significant life stressor, including a
behavioral health diagnosis [54, 6]. Although this information is publicly available, it is unclear as to
how this knowledge could be leveraged or used to inform future accession policy as there is currently
no linkage of accession data to future health outcomes. Future work could investigate further into the
different behavioral health diagnoses that eventually led to suicides and determine whether PTSD
may have been a major factor in these outcomes to inform future accession policymaking.
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5.3.9 Consideration of Additional External Political and Social Dynamics
Section 2.5.2 discussed previous work which applied system dynamics to health care settings to
model integrated policies involving multiple stakeholders, demonstrating the value of system dy-
namics as a modeling method to elucidate leverage points for effecting visible change at the enterprise-
level as opposed to focusing on the unit-level or individual-level. Although system dynamics has
been applied in investigating complex issues in health care, the body of literature still remains
relatively little; additionally, system dynamics applications to military settings have only recently
emerged. A working paper by Anderson & Black used system dynamics to model insurgency and
counter-insurgency dynamics that visualized the accumulations of social capital and the activities
that affect the political and social context in which social capital is generated in times of warfare
[5]. Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were also affected by political and social dynamics
such as the creation of a new democratic governments, the training of internal military forces and
resistance to opposing guerrilla warfare (i.e. [36, 57, 94]). Because PTSD is considered a signifi-
cant pathology of OIF/OEF, future work could investigate the connection between the political and
social dynamics in the Middle East and the dynamics modeled for this thesis. In addition, the ef-
fect of PTSD on society as manifested through issues such as substance abuse, domestic violence
and homelessness were briefly discussed in Section 4.4.3 as additional enterprise-level dynamics
to consider that are likely connected to psychological health issues experienced by military service
members and veterans. Future work could also build upon the system dynamics model in this thesis
to investigate and include these societal dynamics as well.
5.3.10 Additional Qualitative Validation and Development of a Collaborative Model
Section 3.5 referenced the qualitative interviews conducted as a basis for and to validate the system
dynamics model presented in this thesis. However, validating the qualitative model with a limited
interview set and without collaborative thinking can oftentimes be quite challenging. Adamides and
Karacapilidis (2005) recognized the value of group model building, which involves stakeholders in
the model building process, combining each stakeholder's perspective and ideas to build a model
representing the context in which the organization operates to facilitate strategic planning [3]. Ad-
ditional interviews with other service members from the line and medical settings, as well as with
military psychological health providers, strategic analysts and decision makers would provide ad-
ditional validation for the model. In addition, this work could drive the expansion of the system
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Figure 5-1: Enterprise Architecting-Eight Views [71]
dynamics model in this thesis into a collaborative model for future research in the area of military
health care delivery.
5.3.11 Enterprise Architecting-A Framework for Complex Systems
Nightingale and Rhodes [71] found that enterprises are often insufficiently architected from a sin-
gle point of view, such as a strategy view or a process view, and posit that enterprises must be
architected from all architectural views collectively (Strategy, Organization, Processes, Knowledge,
Information, Policy, and Products/Services), as alignment across all views is critical to achieving
performance [71] (Figure 5-1).
The military system for delivering psychological health care is also a highly complex, large
enterprise that consists of multiple organizations, processes and stakeholders. This thesis work has
demonstrated how a systems approach can inform policymaking in military mental health care de-
livery by showing how intended policies may have unintended downstream consequences. Policy
recommendations and their implications were explored. In addition, this work has highlighted areas
to consider in architecting a future enterprise state, such as the existence of time delays in DoD
policy creation and the usage of health outcomes information to inform performance measurements
and military health policies. Future work could address how to utilize the Enterprise Architecture
(EA) framework for creating a future state that incorporates these policy recommendations. Other
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work could analyze where these policy recommendations would have the most impact in the enter-
prise by mapping these areas of consideration to relevant architectural views. Finally, utilizing the
EA framework to architect a future state would supplement the system dynamics work done in this
thesis by demonstrating which views were not captured in the system dynamics model, and suggest
how these views might be best represented as additions to the system dynamics model.
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Appendix A
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
A&E accident & emergency
AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test
AMSARA Accession Medical Standards Analysis and Research Activity
ART Airman Resiliency Training (Air Force)
ASR Acute Stress Reaction
ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery
COSC Combat Operational Stress Control
COSR Combat (or Ongoing Military) Operational Stress Reaction
CSF Comprehensive Soldier Fitness
DCoE Defense Centers of Excellence
DEP Delayed Entry Program
DepSecDef Deputy Secretary of Defense
DHP Defense Health Program
DoD Department of Defense
DSM Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
EA Enterprise Architecture
EPS Existing Prior to Service
FHP&R Force, Health Protection & Readiness
GAO Government Accountability Office
LAI Lean Advancement Initiative
LESAT Lean Enterprise Self Assessment Tool
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MDR military demand-resource
MEPCOM U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command
MEPS Military Entrance Processing Station
MHAT Mental Health Advisory Team
MHS Military Health System
MIRS MEPCOM Integrated Resource System
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MTF Military Treatment Facility
MOS Military Occupational Specialties
OASD-HA Office of the Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OSC Operational Stress Control (Navy)
OSCAR Operational Stress Control and Readiness Program (Marine Corps)
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAS Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed
PDHA Post-Deployment Health Assessment
PDHRA Post-Deployment Health Reassessment
PHA Pre-Deployment Health Assessment
PSA Principal Staff Assistant
PTSD Post-traumatic stress disorder
ROI return on investment
SecDef Secretary of Defense
TBI traumatic brain injury
USD P&R Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
VA Veterans Affairs
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Appendix B
System Dynamics Model of the Military
Mental Health Enterprise
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Appendix C
Stock and Flow Diagram: Military
Service Lifecycle
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C.1 Documentation
(01) Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Deployment
Rate+Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate , 102549) Units: Service Members
(02) Accepted Military Service Members= INTEG ( Accession Rate+Waiver Acceptance Rate-
Deployment Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(03) Accession Rate= Fractional Accession Rate*Military Service Applicants Units: Service
Members/Year
(04) Applicants Eligible for Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Health Waiver Rejection Rate-Waiver
Approval Rate+Health Related Rejection Rate , 27421) Units: Service Members
(05) Applicants Granted Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Waiver Acceptance Rate+Waiver Approval
Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(06) Application Rate= 251370 Units: Service Members/Year
(07) Deploy Again Rate= Fractional Deploy Again Rate*Returned Service Members Units:
Service Members
(08) Deployed Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Deployed
Service Members Units: Service Members/Year
(09) Deployed Onset Rate= Service Members Deployed*Fractional Deployed Onset Rate Units:
Service Members/Year
(10) Deployed Return Rate= Fractional Deployed Return Rate*Treated Deployed Service Mem-
bers Units: Service Members/Year
(11) Deployed Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Deployed Service Members *Fractional Deployed
Treatment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(12) Deployment Rate= Fractional Deployment Rate*Accepted Military Service Members Units:
Service Members/Year
(13) Diagnosed Deploy Rate= Diagnosed Service Members *Fractional Diagnosed Deploy Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(14) Diagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Diagnosis Rate-Deployed
Treatment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(15) Diagnosed Service Members= INTEG ( Diagnosis Rate-Diagnosed Deploy Rate-Treatment
Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(16) Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD
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Units: Service Members/Year
(17) Discharge Rate= Treated Service Members *Fractional Discharge Rate Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(18) FINAL TIME = 100 Units: Year The final time for the simulation.
(19) Fractional Accession Rate= 0.593 Units: Service Members/Service Members/Year
(20) Fractional Deploy Again Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(21) Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: 1/Year
(22) Fractional
(23) Fractional
(24) Fractional
(25) Fractional
(26) Fractional
(27) Fractional
(28) Fractional
(29) Fractional
(30) Fractional
(31) Fractional
(32) Fractional
(33) Fractional
(34) Fractional
(35) Fractional
(36) Fractional
(37) Fractional
Deployed Onset Rate= 0.26 Units: 1/Year
Deployed Return Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
Deployed Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: I/Year
Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
Diagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: I/Year
Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: 1/Year
Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= 0.862 Units: 1/Year
Health Related Rejection Rate= 0.108 Units: I/Year
Health Waiver Rejection Rate= 0.386 Units: I/Year
Onset Rate= 0.26 Units: 1/Year
Redeployment Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
Reserves Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
Return Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
Returned Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: I/Year
Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: ]/Year
(38) Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(39) Fractional Waiver Acceptance Rate= 0.394 Units: I/Year
(40) Fractional Waiver Approval Rate= 0.614 Units: I/Year
(41) Guard and Reserves Applicants= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession
Rate+Guard and Reserves Application Rate , 102549) Units: Service Members
(42) Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= Fractional Guard and Reserves Appli-
cants Accession Rate*Guard and Reserves Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(43) Guard and Reserves Application Rate= 102549 Units: Service Members/Year
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(44) Guard and Reserves Deployment Rate= Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members *Fractional
Reserves Deployment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(45) Health Related Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate*Military Service
Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(46) Health Waiver Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate*Applicants Eligi-
ble for Health Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
(47) INITIAL TIME = 0 Units: Year The initial time for the simulation.
(48) Military Service Applicants= INTEG ( -Accession Rate-Health Related Rejection Rate+Application
Rate, 353919) Units: Service Members
(49) Onset Rate= Fractional Onset Rate*Returned Service Members Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(50) Redeployment Rate= Fractional Redeployment Rate*Treated Service Members Units: Ser-
vice Members/Year
(51) Return Rate= Fractional Return Rate*Service Members Deployed Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(52) Returned Discharge Rate= Returned Service Members*Fractional Returned Discharge Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(53) Returned Service Members= INTEG (Deployed Return Rate+Return Rate-Deploy Again
Rate-Onset Rate-Returned Discharge Rate , 0) Units: Service Members
(54) SAVEPER = TIME STEP Units: Year [0,?] The frequency with which output is stored.
(55) Service Members Deployed= INTEG ( Deployment Rate+Diagnosed Deploy Rate+Guard
and Reserves Deployment Rate+ Redeployment Rate+Undiagnosed Deploy Rate-Deployed Onset
Rate-Return Rate, 186300) Units: Service Members
(56) TIME STEP = 1 Units: Year [0,?] The time step for the simulation.
(57) Treated Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( -Deployed Return Rate+Deployed Treat-
ment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(58) Treated Service Members= INTEG ( Treatment Rate-Redeployment Rate-Discharge Rate,
0) Units: Service Members
(59) Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Service Members*Fractional Treatment Rate Units: Service
Members/Year
(60) Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate*Undiagnosed Service
Members with PTSD Units: Service Members/Year
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(61) Undiagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Onset Rate-Deployed Di-
agnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(62) Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD= INTEG ( Onset Rate-Undiagnosed Deploy
Rate-Diagnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(63) Waiver Acceptance Rate= Applicants Granted Health Waivers*Fractional Waiver Accep-
tance Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(64) Waiver Approval Rate= Fractional Waiver Approval Rate*Applicants Eligible for Health
Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
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Appendix D
Stock and Flow Diagram: Unit Support
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D.1 Documentation
(01) Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Deployment
Rate+Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate, 102549) Units: Service Members
(02) Accepted Military Service Members= INTEG ( Accession Rate+Waiver Acceptance Rate-
Deployment Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(03) Accession Rate= Fractional Accession Rate*Military Service Applicants Units: Service
Members/Year
(04) Applicants Eligible for Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Health Waiver Rejection Rate-Waiver
Approval Rate+Health Related Rejection Rate , 27421) Units: Service Members
(05) Applicants Granted Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Waiver Acceptance Rate+Waiver Approval
Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(06) Application Rate= 251370 Units: Service Members/Year
(07) Deploy Again Rate= Fractional Deploy Again Rate*Returned Service Members Units:
Service Members
(08) Deployed Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Deployed
Service Members Units: Service Members/Year
(09) Deployed Onset Rate= Service Members Deployed*Fractional Deployed Onset Rate Units:
Service Members/Year
(10) Deployed Return Rate= Fractional Deployed Return Rate*Treated Deployed Service Mem-
bers Units: Service Members/Year
(11) Deployed Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Deployed Service Members *Fractional Deployed
Treatment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(12) Deployment Rate= Fractional Deployment Rate*Accepted Military Service Members Units:
Service Members/Year
(13) Diagnosed Deploy Rate= Diagnosed Service Members *Fractional Diagnosed Deploy Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(14) Diagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Diagnosis Rate-Deployed
Treatment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(15) Diagnosed Service Members= INTEG ( Diagnosis Rate-Diagnosed Deploy Rate-Treatment
Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(16) Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD
Units: Service Members/Year
(17) Discharge Rate= Treated Service Members *Fractional Discharge Rate Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(18) FINAL TIME = 100 Units: Year The final time for the simulation.
(19) Fractional Accession Rate= 0.593 Units: Service Members/Service Members/Year
(20) Fractional Deploy Again Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(21) Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: I/Year
(22) Fractional Deployed Onset Rate= -0.1 22*Unit Support+0.56 Units: I/Year
(23) Fractional Deployed Return Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(24) Fractional Deployed Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: 1/Year
(25) Fractional Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(26) Fractional Diagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(27) Fractional Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: 1/Year
(28) Fractional Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: 1/Year
(29) Fractional Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= 0.862 Units: I/Year
(30) Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate= 0.108 Units: 1/Year
(31) Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate= 0.386 Units: 1/Year
(32) Fractional Onset Rate= -0.122*Unit Support+0.56 Units: I/Year
(33) Fractional Redeployment Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(34) Fractional Reserves Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(35) Fractional Return Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(36) Fractional Returned Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: I/Year
(37) Fractional Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: I/Year
(38) Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(39) Fractional Waiver Acceptance Rate= 0.394 Units: I /Year
(40) Fractional Waiver Approval Rate= 0.614 Units: 1/Year
(41) Guard and Reserves Applicants= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession
Rate+Guard and Reserves Application Rate , 102549) Units: Service Members
(42) Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= Fractional Guard and Reserves Appli-
cants Accession Rate*Guard and Reserves Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(43) Guard and Reserves Application Rate= 102549 Units: Service Members/Year
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(44) Guard and Reserves Deployment Rate= Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members *Fractional
Reserves Deployment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(45) Health Related Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate*Military Service
Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(46) Health Waiver Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate*Applicants Eligi-
ble for Health Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
(47) INITIAL TIME = 0 Units: Year The initial time for the simulation.
(48) Military Service Applicants= INTEG ( -Accession Rate-Health Related Rejection Rate+Application
Rate, 353919) Units: Service Members
(49) Onset Rate= Fractional Onset Rate*Returned Service Members Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(50) Redeployment Rate= Fractional Redeployment Rate*Treated Service Members Units: Ser-
vice Members/Year
(51) Return Rate= Fractional Return Rate*Service Members Deployed Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(52) Returned Discharge Rate= Returned Service Members *Fractional Returned Discharge Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(53) Returned Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Return Rate+Return Rate-Deploy Again
Rate-Onset Rate-Returned Discharge Rate , 0) Units: Service Members
(54) SAVEPER = TIME STEP Units: Year [0,?] The frequency with which output is stored.
(55) Service Members Deployed= INTEG ( Deployment Rate+Diagnosed Deploy Rate+Guard
and Reserves Deployment Rate+ Redeployment Rate+Undiagnosed Deploy Rate-Deployed Onset
Rate-Return Rate, 186300) Units: Service Members
(56) TIME STEP = I Units: Year [0,?] The time step for the simulation.
(57) Treated Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( -Deployed Return Rate+Deployed Treat-
ment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(58) Treated Service Members= INTEG ( Treatment Rate-Redeployment Rate-Discharge Rate,
0) Units: Service Members
(59) Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Service Members*Fractional Treatment Rate Units: Service
Members/Year
(60) Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate*Undiagnosed Service
Members with PTSD Units: Service Members/Year
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(61) Undiagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Onset Rate-Deployed Di-
agnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(62) Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD= INTEG ( Onset Rate-Undiagnosed Deploy
Rate-Diagnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(63) Unit Support= 2.447 Units: Dmnl
(64) Waiver Acceptance Rate= Applicants Granted Health Waivers *Fractional Waiver Accep-
tance Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(65) Waiver Approval Rate= Fractional Waiver Approval Rate*Applicants Eligible for Health
Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
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Appendix E
Stock and Flow Diagram: Utilization of
Resilience Resources
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E.1 Documentation
(01) Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Deployment
Rate+Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate, 102549) Units: Service Members
(02) Accepted Military Service Members= INTEG ( Accession Rate+Waiver Acceptance Rate-
Deployment Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(03) Accession Rate= Fractional Accession Rate*Military Service Applicants Units: Service
Members/Year
(04) Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources= 0.63 Units: Dmnl Pre-deployment Battlemind
Training (MHAT V)
(05) Applicants Eligible for Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Health Waiver Rejection Rate-Waiver
Approval Rate+Health Related Rejection Rate , 27421) Units: Service Members
(06) Applicants Granted Health Waivers= INTEG ( -Waiver Acceptance Rate+Waiver Approval
Rate, 234547) Units: Service Members
(07) Application Rate= 251370 Units: Service Members/Year
(08) Deploy Again Rate= Fractional Deploy Again Rate*Returned Service Members Units:
Service Members
(09) Deployed Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Deployed
Service Members Units: Service Members/Year
(10) Deployed Onset Rate= Service Members Deployed*Fractional Deployed Onset Rate Units:
Service Members/Year
(11) Deployed Return Rate= Fractional Deployed Return Rate*Treated Deployed Service Mem-
bers Units: Service Members/Year
(12) Deployed Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Deployed Service Members *Fractional Deployed
Treatment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(13) Deployment Rate= Fractional Deployment Rate*Accepted Military Service Members Units:
Service Members/Year
(14) Diagnosed Deploy Rate= Diagnosed Service Members *Fractional Diagnosed Deploy Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(15) Diagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Diagnosis Rate-Deployed
Treatment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(16) Diagnosed Service Members= INTEG ( Diagnosis Rate-Diagnosed Deploy Rate-Treatment
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Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(17) Diagnosis Rate= Fractional Diagnosis Rate*Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD
Units: Service Members/Year
(18) Discharge Rate= Treated Service Members *Fractional Discharge Rate Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(19) FINAL TIME = 100 Units: Year The final time for the simulation.
(20) Fractional Accession Rate= 0.593 Units: Service Members/Service Members/Year
(21) Fractional Deploy Again Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(22) Fractional Deployed Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: I/Year
(23) Fractional Deployed Onset Rate= 0.26 Units: I/Year
(24) Fractional Deployed Return Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(25) Fractional Deployed Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: 1/Year
(26) Fractional Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(27) Fractional Diagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(28) Fractional Diagnosis Rate= 0.25 Units: 1/Year
(29) Fractional Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: 1 /Year
(30) Fractional Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= 0.862 Units: I/Year
(31) Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate= 0.108 Units: I/Year
(32) Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate= 0.386 Units: 1/Year
(33) Fractional Onset Rate= Actual Utilization of Resilience Resources*0. 12+( I-Actual Utiliza-
tion of Resilience Resources )*0.205 Units: I/Year
(34) Fractional Redeployment Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(35) Fractional Reserves Deployment Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(36) Fractional Return Rate= 0.12 Units: 1/Year
(37) Fractional Returned Discharge Rate= 0.17 Units: 1/Year
(38) Fractional Treatment Rate= 0.3 Units: 1/Year
(39) Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= 0.12 Units: I/Year
(40) Fractional Waiver Acceptance Rate= 0.394 Units: I/Year
(41) Fractional Waiver Approval Rate= 0.614 Units: 1/Year
(42) Guard and Reserves Applicants= INTEG ( -Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession
Rate+Guard and Reserves Application Rate, 102549) Units: Service Members
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(43) Guard and Reserves Applicants Accession Rate= Fractional Guard and Reserves Appli-
cants Accession Rate*Guard and Reserves Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(44) Guard and Reserves Application Rate= 102549 Units: Service Members/Year
(45) Guard and Reserves Deployment Rate= Accepted Guard and Reserve Service Members *Fractional
Reserves Deployment Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(46) Health Related Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Related Rejection Rate*Military Service
Applicants Units: Service Members/Year
(47) Health Waiver Rejection Rate= Fractional Health Waiver Rejection Rate*Applicants Eligi-
ble for Health Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
(48) INITIAL TIME = 0 Units: Year The initial time for the simulation.
(49) Military Service Applicants= INTEG ( -Accession Rate-Health Related Rejection Rate+Application
Rate, 353919) Units: Service Members
(50) Onset Rate= Fractional Onset Rate*Returned Service Members Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(51) Redeployment Rate= Fractional Redeployment Rate*Treated Service Members Units: Ser-
vice Members/Year
(52) Return Rate= Fractional Return Rate*Service Members Deployed Units: Service Mem-
bers/Year
(53) Returned Discharge Rate= Returned Service Members *Fractional Returned Discharge Rate
Units: Service Members/Year
(54) Returned Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Return Rate+Return Rate-Deploy Again
Rate-Onset Rate-Returned Discharge Rate , 0) Units: Service Members
(55) SAVEPER = TIME STEP Units: Year [0,?] The frequency with which output is stored.
(56) Service Members Deployed= INTEG ( Deployment Rate+Diagnosed Deploy Rate+Guard
and Reserves Deployment Rate+ Redeployment Rate+Undiagnosed Deploy Rate-Deployed Onset
Rate-Return Rate, 186300) Units: Service Members
(57) TIME STEP = I Units: Year [0,?] The time step for the simulation.
(58) Treated Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( -Deployed Return Rate+Deployed Treat-
ment Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(59) Treated Service Members= INTEG ( Treatment Rate-Redeployment Rate-Discharge Rate,
0) Units: Service Members
(60) Treatment Rate= Diagnosed Service Members*Fractional Treatment Rate Units: Service
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Members/Year
(61) Undiagnosed Deploy Rate= Fractional Undiagnosed Deploy Rate*Undiagnosed Service
Members with PTSD Units: Service Members/Year
(62) Undiagnosed Deployed Service Members= INTEG ( Deployed Onset Rate-Deployed Di-
agnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(63) Undiagnosed Service Members with PTSD= INTEG ( Onset Rate-Undiagnosed Deploy
Rate-Diagnosis Rate, 0) Units: Service Members
(64) Waiver Acceptance Rate= Applicants Granted Health Waivers*Fractional Waiver Accep-
tance Rate Units: Service Members/Year
(65) Waiver Approval Rate= Fractional Waiver Approval Rate*Applicants Eligible for Health
Waivers Units: Service Members/Year
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Appendix F
Overview of Department of Defense
Issuances [28]
F.1 DoD Directives
" Exclusively establish policy, assign responsibilities, and delegate authority to DoD Compo-
nents
" Contain no procedures
" Two types: Direct Oversight and Chartering
F.1.1 Direct Oversight
" Require SecDef or DepSecDef direct oversight and signature; 8 pages long; contain only:
" Non-delegable SecDef or DepSecDef responsibilities;
" Assignment of functions and resources between/among PSAs and/or DoD Components;
" Designation of Executive Agents and assignment of related responsibilities and authorities;
or
" Matters of SecDef or DepSecDef special interest
F.1.2 Chartering
" Establish OSD Component Head, PAS official, Defense Agency, DoD Field Activity, or other
major DoD or OSD Components official mission, responsibilities,
" functions, relationships, and delegated authorities
" Signed by the SecDef or DepSecDef
" Signed by the Under Secretaries delegated the authority in their charter for subordinate OSD
PAS officials
F.2 DoD Instructions
" Establish or implement policy
" May contain overarching procedures
" If exceeding 50 pages, shall be separated into volumes
" Two types: Policy and Non-Policy
F.2.1 Policy Instructions
" Establish policy and assign responsibilities within a functional area assigned in an OSD Com-
ponent Heads charter
* May provide GENERAL procedures for implementing the policy
" Signed only by OSD Component Heads or their Principal Deputies
" Include OSD Components charter as a reference
F.2.2 Non-Policy Instructions
" Implement policy established in a Directive or policy Instruction
" Procedures are more detailed
" Provide procedures for carrying out the policy
132
" Signed by OSD Component Heads, Principal Deputies, or other OSD PAS officials as autho-
rized by their charters
" Includes OSD Components charter as a reference (if the Principal Deputy or PAS official has
a charter, that will be used)
F.3 DoD Manuals
" Implement or supplement a Directive or policy Instruction. Shall be authorized by a Directive
or policy Instruction. The authorizing issuance shall be cited in the Manual and included as a
reference
" Identify uniform procedures for managing or operating systems and provide administrative
information
" If exceeding 100 pages, shall be separated into volumes
" May contain a policy section; SUMMARIZING policy established elsewhere
" Signed by OSD Component Heads, Principal Deputies, or other OSD PAS officials as autho-
rized by their charters
" All DoD publications that are not Manuals (i.e., catalogs, compendiums, directories, guides,
handbooks, indexes, inventories, lists, modules, pamphlets, plans, regulations, series, stan-
dards, and supplements) shall be converted into Manuals on their next reissuance
F.4 Directive-Type Memos
Issued:
" ONLY for a time-sensitive action that affects a current DoD issuance or that will become a
DoD issuance
" ONLY when time constraints prevent publishing a new issuance or a change to an existing
issuance
May:
* Establish policy and assign responsibilities; or
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* Implement policies and responsibilities established in existing Directives or Instructions
Signature Authority for memos:
" Requiring SecDef or DepSecDef direct oversight - SecDef or DepSecDef
" Establishing policy-OSD Component Heads or their Principal Deputies
" Implementing policy-OSD Component Heads, Principal Deputies, or other OSD PAS offi-
cials as authorized by their charters
Effective for no more than 180 days from the date signed; after that it must be incorporated into
an existing DoD issuance, converted to a new DoD issuance, reissued, or canceled
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